Justices Duck Religious Baker Case – Ignore Simple Alternative

Justices Duck Religious Baker Case – Ignore Simple Alternative
JillWellington / Pixabay

Justices Duck Religious Baker Case – Ignore Simple Alternative; British High Court Follows Precedents, and Law Professor‘s Suggested Compromise

WASHINGTON, DC, June 17, 2019 – The Supreme Court has declined to review a case in which a baker, largely on religious grounds, refused to make a cake for a same-sex wedding, but there’s an alternative legal analysis which avoids conflict between religious rights and protecting LGBT people from discrimination, says public interest law professor John Banzhaf, who has won over 100 gender discrimination cases.

Know more about Russia than your friends:

Get our free ebook on how the Soviet Union became Putin's Russia.

Q1 hedge fund letters, conference, scoops etc

Why The Term ‘Value Investing’ Is Redundant

Warren BuffettWhat does value investing really mean? Q1 2021 hedge fund letters, conferences and more Some investors might argue value investing means buying stocks trading at a discount to net asset value or book value. This is the sort of value investing Benjamin Graham pioneered in the early 1920s and 1930s. Other investors might argue value Read More

For example, Britain's Supreme Court, following the rationale of several U.S. cases, and a compromise position advocated by Banzhaf, has upheld the right of a baker to refuse to bake a case with a message supporting same-sex marriage.

The British court's reasoning followed that laid out by Banzhaf - the need to distinguish between discrimination based upon the sexual orientation of the customer (which is illegal), and discrimination based upon the message, regardless of who the customer is (which is legal). Here's what the British court said:

"There was no discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation . . .  It is deeply humiliating, and an affront to human dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person's race, gender, disability, sexual orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics.  But that is not what happened in this case and it does the prospect of equal treatment no favors to seek to extend it beyond its proper scope."

The British court ruled that "there is a clear distinction between refusing to produce a cake conveying a particular message, for any customer who wants such a cake, and refusing to produce a cake for the particular customer who wants it because of that customer's characteristics," since the bakery "would have refused to supply this particular cake to anyone, whatever their personal characteristics."

When a similar case requiring a baker to bake a cake with a same-sex message first began in the U.S., some devout business people worried that they would be required to participate by providing either products (e.g., wedding cakes with a he-and-he theme) and/or services (e.g., video recording of such a wedding), even if their participation or support for such services violates deeply held religions views.

This is especially true in those states where statutes prohibit discrimination in "public accommodations" (which include most businesses) based upon sexual orientation.  Some states also have a Religious Freedom Restoration Act [RFRA] which some argue must override anti-discrimination laws to protect basic religious freedoms.  In some situations, these two interests may appear to conflict.

But there is a simple way to protect both important interests, says Banzhaf, who has won over 100 legal actions fighting illegal discrimination against women, blacks, Jews, the deaf, and others.  He points to a pair of recent legal decisions which illustrate this principle in action.

His novel answer is to simply follow the clear and express language of the anti-discrimination statutes, and punish denials of services where they are based upon the status of the requester (e.g., gay, female, black), but not when the denial is based solely upon the message - the "speech" for First Amendment purposes - which the merchant would be required to send by his support of the same-sex marriage ceremony.

Banzhaf notes that religious Christians who do not wish to sell he-and-he wedding cakes for gay weddings - like religious Jews who do not want to bake swastika-shaped cakes for the KKK, or Muslims who do not wish to cater weddings at which alcohol will be served - may be able to do so legally by having a uniform business policy which applies equally to all prospective purchasers, regardless of their individual race, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, etc.

In states which have laws prohibiting discrimination against people based upon their sexual orientation, it would be illegal for a baker to refuse to sell any kind of cake to a person simply because he is gay, regardless of the type of cake or the message it may convey. But refusing to sell a wedding cake with a same-sex statue or inscription on top to anyone at all, regardless of sexual orientation, would not violate the words of the statute since nobody is being discriminated against because of their own sexual orientation.

So, if a baker would refuse to prepare such a cake for a gay person, but would do exactly the same if the request for the same cake came from a best man who is straight, or from the heterosexual mother of one of the celebrants, the letter of the law wouldn't be broken because the refusal is not based upon a protected characteristic (e.g., sexual orientation), but rather upon the message being sent (e.g., same sex marriages are OK) - i.e.,  the speech the baker would be forced to utter.

Similarly, a Jewish bakery might have a policy against baking a cake in the shape of a swastika, whether it is ordered by a German Nazi sympathizer, a racist fraternity, a Jewish student seeking to "take back" the hated symbol (similar to a recent situation at GWU), a crude student who wants it as a joke, etc.

In each case, there is no discrimination based upon a protected factor because the baker is treating all prospective purchasers the same, regardless of sexual orientation, gender, religion, etc.

One advantage of limiting anti-discrimination statutes to protection against refusals to serve customers based upon the customers' own sexual orientation, but permitting businesses not to utter messages (including in cake decorations, figurines, etc.) of which they disapprove means the government (either a bureaucrat or a judge) doesn't have to engage in a subjective balancing act regarding how compelling is the government's interest, are their other feasible approaches, etc. - a weighing required by RFRA, and arguably by the First Amendment.

It also does not unfairly elevate religious freedom above similar desires not to participate - to "speak" for First Amendment purposes - based upon ethical/moral grounds rather than religious ones.

The problem with using religious freedom laws to protect people such as these bakers put into such situations is that it would protect bakers who refuse to make such cakes based upon their own religious beliefs, but not those who do exactly the same for simple moral or ethical considerations, Banzhaf says.

Doing what he recommends - permitting merchants to refuse to provide services based upon the message conveyed by their actions, but not permitting them to deny services solely based upon the characteristics of those requesting the service - would eliminate this unnecessary disparity.

Most people would probably agree that no baker should be required to prepare a cake with a symbol to which he is strongly opposed, for religious or for other ethical or moral reasons.

Thus, no baker should be forced to bake a cake encouraging (or opposing) abortion (depending on his point of view), supporting or opposing gun control, depicting sexual activity or witchcraft, etc. against his wishes.

This simple distinction is illustrated by two recent decisions involving bakeries.  The Colorado Civil Rights Division ruled that a cake shop could not refuse to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, calling it discriminatory, because the baker's refusal was based upon the sexual orientation of the customers.

However, when a Christian customer ordered cakes with writing which Denver's Azucar Bakery considered derogatory towards gays, the bakery's refusal to provide the cake was upheld because it would refuse to provide a cake with that language to any potential customer - gay or straight, Christian or atheist,  etc., and for any purpose.

Although the customer claimed that the refusal to provide him with a cake with this message was "demeaning to his beliefs," the agency said the owner was within his rights to refuse to put a message on cakes which included that language and imagery, provided it would do the same for all customers.

These two decisions illustrate how such an approach can work in practice.  No bakery can refuse to provide services to customers, just because they happen to be Christian, gay, black, female, etc.

However, every bakery is free not to be forced to put statements onto cakes which they find offensive - whether on grounds of religion, or for reasons of ethics, morals, or good taste.

No civil rights official or judge has to make any decision about whether the religious motive is sincere, whether the state's interest is sufficiently compelling, or whether religious views give a business more leeway to refuse service.

There is no inherent conflict between religious freedom and a freedom from discrimination, argues Banzhaf, if anti-discrimination statutes are simply interpreted the way they are written.


Professor of Public Interest Law

George Washington University Law School,

FAMRI Dr. William Cahan Distinguished Professor,

Fellow, World Technology Network,

Founder, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH),

2000 H Street, NW, Wash, DC 20052, USA

(202) 994-7229 // (703) 527-8418

http://banzhaf.net/ jbanzhaf3ATgmail.com  @profbanzhaf

No posts to display