Stock diversification is overrated.
Alternatives are more overrated.Electron Rises 5.1% Buy Renewable And Infrastructure Stocks: Q1 Letter
Electron Capital Partners' flagship Electron Global Fund returned 5.1% in the first quarter of 2021, outperforming its benchmark, the MSCI World Utilities Index by 5.2%. Q1 2021 hedge fund letters, conferences and more According to a copy of the fund's first-quarter letter to investors, the average net exposure during the quarter was 43.0%. At the Read More
High quality bonds are underrated.
This post was triggered by a guy from the UK who sent me an infographic on reducing risk that I thought was mediocre at best. First, I don’t like infographics or video. I want to learn things quickly. Give me well-written text to read. A picture is worth maybe fifty words, not a thousand, when it comes to business writing, perhaps excluding some well-designed graphs.
Here’s the problem. Do you want to reduce the volatility of your asset portfolio? I have the solution for you. Buy bonds and hold some cash.
And some say to me, “Wait, I want my money to work hard. Can’t you find investments that offer a higher return that diversify my portfolio of stocks and other risky assets?” In a word the answer is “no,” though some will tell you otherwise.
Now once upon a time, in ancient times, prior to the Nixon Era, no one hedged, and no one looked for alternative investments. Those buying stocks stuck to well-financed “blue chip” companies.
Some clever people realized that they could take risk in other areas, and so they broadened their stock exposure to include:
- Growth stocks
- Midcap stocks (value & growth)
- Small cap stocks (value & growth)
- REITs and other income passthrough vehicles (BDCs, Royalty Trusts, MLPs, etc.)
- Developed International stocks (of all kinds)
- Emerging Market stocks
- Frontier Market stocks
- And more…
And initially, it worked. There was significant diversification until… the new asset subclasses were crowded with institutional money seeking the same things as the original diversifiers.
Now, was there no diversification left? Not much. The diversification from investor behavior is largely gone (the liability side of correlation). Different sectors of the global economy don’t move in perfect lockstep, so natively the return drivers of the assets are 60-90% correlated (the asset side of correlation, think of how the cost of capital moves in a correlated way across companies). Yes, there are a few nooks and crannies that are neglected, like Russia and Brazil, industries that are deeply out of favor like gold, oil E&P, coal, mining, etc., but you have to hold your nose and take reputational risk to buy them. How many institutional investors want to take a 25% chance of losing a lot of clients by failing unconventionally?
Why do I hear crickets? Hmm…
Well, the game wasn’t up yet, and those that pursued diversification pursued alternatives, and they bought:
- Real Estate
- Private Equity
- Collateralized debt obligations of many flavors
- Junk bonds
- Distressed Debt
- Merger Arbitrage
- Convertible Arbitrage
- Other types of arbitrage
- Off-the-beaten track bonds and derivatives, both long and short
- And more… one that stunned me during the last bubble was leverage nonprime commercial paper.
Well guess what? Much the same thing happened here as happened with non-“blue chip” stocks. Initially, it worked. There was significant diversification until… the new asset subclasses were crowded with institutional money seeking the same things as the original diversifiers.
Now, was there no diversification left? Some, but less. Not everyone was willing to do all of these. The diversification from investor behavior was reduced (the liability side of correlation). These don’t move in perfect lockstep, so natively the return drivers of the risky components of the assets are 60-90% correlated over the long run (the asset side of correlation, think of how the cost of capital moves in a correlated way across companies). Yes, there are some that are neglected, but you have to hold your nose and take reputational risk to buy them, or sell them short. Many of those blew up last time. How many institutional investors want to take a 25% chance of losing a lot of clients by failing unconventionally?
Why do I hear crickets again? Hmm…
That’s why I don’t think there is a lot to do anymore in diversifying risky assets beyond a certain point. Spread your exposures, and do it intelligently, such that the eggs are in baskets are different as they can be, without neglecting the effort to buy attractive assets.
But beyond that, hold dry powder. Think of cash, which doesn’t earn much or lose much. Think of some longer high quality bonds that do well when things are bad, like long treasuries.
Remember, the reward for taking business risk in general varies over time. Rewards are relatively thin now, valuations are somewhere in the 9th decile (80-90%). This isn’t a call to go nuts and sell all of your risky asset positions. That requires more knowledge than I will ever have. But it does mean having some dry powder. The amount is up to you as you evaluate your time horizon and your opportunities. Choose wisely. As for me, about 20-30% of my total assets are safe, but I have been a risk-taker most of my life. Again, choose wisely.
PS — if the low volatility anomaly weren’t overfished, along with other aspects of factor investing (Smart Beta!) those might also offer some diversification. You will have to wait for those ideas to be forgotten. Wait to see a few fund closures, and a severe reduction in AUM for the leaders…