Politics

George Soros’ “Plan” For Ukraine Reportedly Leaked

A hacking group claims it has penetrated Ukraine’s presidential administration website and obtained correspondence between George Soros and Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko.

The hacktivists have published three files online, which include a draft of “A short and medium term comprehensive strategy for the new Ukraine – George soros” by Soros (dated March 12, 2015); an undated paper on military assistance to Kiev; and thebillionaire’s letter to Poroshenko and Ukraine’s Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, dated December 23, 2014.

Readers can find more from the documents below. Note: the authenticity of the three letters has not been verified.

H/T ZeroHedge

George Soros is also warning of a potential world war over tension in the South China Sea

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  1. Putin prefers a financial collapse and political infighting that would destabilize all of Ukraine to a military victory that would give him control over part of Ukraine. This is corroborated by the fact that he twice converted a military victory to a cease-fire that recognized the facts on the ground without depriving him of his first mover advantage.

  1. Minsk 2 brings Putin close to attaining his preferred outcome. He is now reverting to military de-escalation in the belief that he has accomplished his mission and in the hope that he can avoid a renewal of the economic sanctions when they expire in July.

  1. The financial and political deterioration of Ukraine makes Putin the winner. This is doomed to continue or accelerate unless Ukraine and its allies can agree on a comprehensive strategy that will deprive Putin of his first-mover advantage. Just as Putin does not obtain Merkel’s and Hollande’s signature before executing his strategy, the same applies in reverse to the strategy below.

II. The Strategy

Ukrainian and allied leaders should agree on the following principles:

  1. In the absence of adequate support from its allies, the new Ukraine is no match for Putin’s Russia.

  1. It is in the collective self-interest of Ukraine’s allies to enable the new Ukraine not only to survive but to prosper; and as long as they can agree on a way of providing adequate support without getting involved in a direct military conflict, they should be able to prevail against Putin’s Russia.

  1. While it would be more desirable to have Russia as a partner than an enemy, that is impossible as long as Putin persists in his current policies.

  1. It will be much more costly, particularly for Europe, to defend itself against the threat that a victorious Putin regime will pose when the new Ukraine collapses, than to provide adequate support to the new Ukraine while it is still alive.

  1. Keeping the new Ukraine alive and helping it to succeed should take precedence over sanctions against Russia. Sanctions must be maintained and if necessary strengthened as long as Putin persists in overt military attacks on Ukrainian soil; but they harm not only the Russian but also the European and global economy. They also reinforce Putin’s narrative that blames Russia’s problems entirely on the implacable hostility of the ‘West’. This helps him to retain the support of the Russian people and to consolidate his power. By contrast, a functioning democracy in Ukraine that manages to reform its economy even in the midst of Russian aggression would turn Putin’s narrative into a lie that no amount of propaganda could cover up. More and more Russians would want to follow Ukraine’s example.

  1. Therefore Ukraine’s allies should treat Ukraine as a defense priority, not as another Greece. They should declare that they will do whatever it takes to help the new Ukraine succeed short of getting involved in direct military confrontation with Russia or violating the Minsk agreement.

III. The short-term: the next three months

  1. What Ukraine must deliver

  1. Restore the fighting capacity of Ukraine without violating the Minsk agreement.

  1. Restore some semblance of currency stability and a functioning banking system.

  1. Maintain unity among the various branches of government.

  1. Preserve the institutional integrity and independence of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)

  1. Provide tangible evidence that the government knows where the leaks in the budget are and knows how to stop them.

    See The full letter from George soros below

George Soros-Ukraine-Strategy

George Soros
George Soros