Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity*

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Abstract

We investigate global factors associated with bank capital flows. We formulate a model of the international banking system where global banks interact with local banks. The solution highlights the bank leverage cycle as the determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of the model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the banking sector, thereby providing a conceptual bridge between exchange rates and financial stability. In a panel study of 46 countries, we find support for the key predictions of our model.

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1 Introduction

It is a cliché that the world has become more connected, but the financial crisis and the boom that preceded it have renewed attention on the global factors that drive financial conditions worldwide. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993, 1996) famously distinguished the global “push” factors for capital flows from the country-specific “pull” factors, and emphasised the importance of external push factors in explaining capital flows to emerging economies in the 1990s. Policy discussion has revolved around the notion of “global liquidity” whereby permissive credit conditions in financial centres are transmitted across borders to other parts of the world (BIS (2011)). More recently, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2013) and Rey (2013) have highlighted the highly synchronised nature of financial conditions across borders and the co-movement in debt flows and credit growth that accompanies it.

In tandem with the discussion of global factors, the dramatic increase in gross capital flows has posed a challenge to the traditional approach to international finance based on net capital flows where financial flows are seen only as the counterpart to the current account. In his Ely lecture, Obstfeld (2012b p.3) concludes that “large gross financial flows entail potential stability risks that may be only distantly related, if related at all, to the global configuration of saving-investment discrepancies.” One reason for the caution is that the growth in gross capital flows was associated with increased leverage and the size of the banking sector as a whole, as emphasised by Borio and Disyatat (2011), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and Schularick and Taylor (2012). In this way, gross capital flows (especially through the banking sector) have received a great deal of recent attention from researchers.\footnote{See Forbes and Warnock (2012), Lane and Pels (2011), Obstfeld (2012a, 2012b), Rey (2013) and Shin (2012).}

The objective of our paper is to shed light on the role of the international banking system in the propagation of global liquidity. We make two contributions.

Our first contribution is to construct a model of global liquidity built around the operation of international banks. We build on recent advances in understanding the leverage cycle of banks in which leverage builds up in booms and falls in busts. The leverage cycle mirrors the fluctuations in collateral requirements (increased “haircuts”) during downturns. Geanakoplos
(2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2012) have examined how the risk bearing capacity of the financial system can be severely diminished when leverage falls through an increase in collateral requirements. Similarly, Gorton (2009, 2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2012) have explored the analogy between classical bank runs and the modern run in capital markets driven by increased collateral requirements and reduced borrowing capacity.

Our model of global banking combines these earlier insights with the institutional features underpinning the international banking system, such as the centralised funding and credit allocation decisions documented by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a, 2012b). In particular, we construct a “double-decker” model of banking where regional banks borrow in US dollars from global banks in order to lend to local corporate borrowers. In turn, the global banks finance cross-border lending to regional banks by tapping US dollar money market funds in financial centres.

A distinctive feature of our model is the link between local currency appreciation and loosening of financial conditions through the build-up of leverage in the banking sector. The channel is through shifts in the effective credit risk faced by banks who lend to local borrowers that may have a currency mismatch. When the local currency appreciates, local borrowers’ balance sheets become stronger, resulting in lower credit risk and hence expanded bank lending capacity. In this way, currency appreciation leads to greater risk-taking by banks. This “risk-taking channel” of currency appreciation entails a link between exchange rates and financial stability.

In addition, given the pre-eminent role of the US dollar as the currency used to denominate debt contracts, our results shed light on why dollar appreciation constitutes a tightening of global financial conditions, and why financial crises are associated with dollar shortages.

The combination of the rapid growth of the banking sector fuelled by capital inflows and an appreciating local currency has been a classic early warning indicator of emerging economy crises. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) conduct an empirical study using data from 1973 to 2010 and find that two factors emerge consistently as the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises, namely a rapid increase in leverage and a sharp real appreciation of the currency. Their finding holds both for emerging and advanced
economies, and holds throughout the sample period. Schularick and Taylor (2012) similarly highlight the role of leverage in financial vulnerability, especially that associated with the banking sector. Our framework addresses the theoretical mechanism behind the link between currency appreciation and the build-up of leverage and is in contrast to conventional macro models of exchange rates where the focus is on the current account.

Another related feature of our model that sets it apart from conventional macro models of exchange rates is that it addresses directly the monetary policy spillovers, especially the impact of lower US dollar borrowing rates on global financial conditions. By addressing the link between funding costs and bank leverage, we can fill in some of the theoretical boxes associated empirical studies of monetary policy spillovers. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) found that a loosening of US monetary policy led to a subsequent depreciation of the US dollar. Bruno and Shin (2013) and Rey (2013) update the evidence and find that banking sector capital flows are closely associated with US monetary policy. Our model provides a possible mechanism to explain the link.

More broadly, our model is well suited in addressing the capacity of the global banking system to bear and distribute the fundamental credit risk. Since risk must be borne somewhere in the system - either directly by lenders to ultimate borrowers, or indirectly by lenders to banks - the aggregate credit risk has to be absorbed by the global banking system as a whole. Our model shows how the risk absorption role of the global banking system imposes a joint restriction on the leverage of the regional and global banks taken together.

The second contribution of our paper is empirical. We investigate how closely the theoretical predictions are borne out empirically. Thanks to the closed-form solution given by our model, we can draw on a number of clear-cut hypotheses on the determinants of cross-border banking flows.

One prediction of our model is that episodes of appreciation of the US dollar are associated with deleveraging of global banks and an overall tightening of global financial conditions. Dollar shortages during crises have received a great deal of attention in the aftermath of

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2On the other hand, our model focuses just on the banking sector and hence is a partial equilibrium in nature. General equilibrium models will enable researchers to integrate macro effects and financial channels in exchange rate determination. Gabaix and Maggiori (2013) is a promising recent example.
Figure 1. Cross-border liabilities by type of counterparty. Left panel shows cross-border debt liabilities by pairwise classification of borrower and lender. “Bank to bank” refers to cross-border claims of banks on other banks (BIS banking statistics table 7A minus 7B). “Bank to non-bank” refers to cross-border claims of banks on non-banks (BIS table 7B). Claims of non-banks are from BIS international debt security statistics, tables 11A and 11B). The right panel shows cross-border debt liabilities of developed countries according to BIS classification.

the 2008 crisis (see, for instance, the BIS study by McGuire and von Peter (2009)). In our panel study of 46 countries we find that an appreciation of the local currency vis-à-vis the US dollar is associated with an acceleration of bank capital flows in the subsequent quarter.

Additionally, an implication of our closed-form solution is that both the level of bank leverage (which determines the rate at which one dollar’s increase in bank capital is turned into lending) and the change in the leverage (which determines the lending based on existing, or infra-marginal bank capital) should enter as “supply push” determinants of banking flows. We find strong support for these predictions in our panel study, thereby verifying that the factors driving bank flows can be found in the determinants of bank leverage. Given the close relationship between bank leverage and the VIX index of implied volatility of S&P 500 equity index options, we shed light both on Forbes and Warnock’s (2012) finding of the explanatory power of the VIX index for gross capital flows in surge episodes, as well as the importance of leverage as a pre-condition for crises as identified by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). Our framework therefore serves as the common thread that ties together these two strands of the literature.

Quantitatively, capital flows through the international banking system have been a sub-
Figure 2. **Cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities.** Left panel shows cross-border bank-to-bank debt liabilities as percentage of GDP of the recipient economy. The right panel shows cross-border bank-to-bank debt liabilities as percentage of total private credit in recipient economy. Cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities are from the BIS banking statistics (table 7A minus 7B). GDP and private credit data are from the World Bank.

A substantial proportion of total cross-border debt flows. The quantitative significance lends weight to the potential economic impact of the framework presented in our paper. Figure 1 shows the classification of cross-border debt liabilities by type of counterparty. We see that cross-border liabilities where both the creditor and debtor are banks is the largest of the four possible categories, and saw rapid increases in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. Figure 1 complements the evidence in Rey (2013) who documents the rapid increase in credit flows relative to FDI and portfolio equity flows. Figure 2 shows that bank-to-bank flows have also played a major role in the expansion of domestic lending. The left hand panel shows cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities as a proportion of GDP, while the right hand panel shows cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities as a proportion of private credit. At the peak in 2007, bank-to-bank cross-border liabilities accounted for 20% of total private credit and for over 30% of GDP.

In the next section, we formulate our model of cross-border banking by first laying out the institutional backdrop for the global banking system. Our model then builds on this discussion. We follow up with our empirical investigation.
2 Model of Bank Capital Flows

2.1 Background

A schematic of the global banking system is sketched in Figure 3. The direction of financial flows goes from right to left to uphold the convention of having assets on the left hand side of the balance sheet and liabilities on the right. In Figure 3, global banks raise wholesale US dollar funding and then lend to local banks in other jurisdictions. The local banks draw on cross-border funding (stage 2) in order to lend to their local borrowers (stage 3). Although the banks are hedged in their currency exposure, the ultimate local borrower has a currency mismatch, financing local currency assets with US dollar borrowing. The motive for the currency mismatch could be to hedge US dollar receivables when costs are in local currency, or the mismatch may be due to speculative motives. In practice, distinguishing hedging from speculation will be challenging.

Our model addresses the pre-eminent role that the US dollar plays in global banking. Figure 4 plots the foreign currency assets and liabilities of banks globally, as measured by the BIS locational banking statistics which are organised according to the residence principle. The US dollar series in Figure 4 shows the US dollar-denominated assets and liabilities of banks outside the United States. The euro series shows the corresponding euro-denominated assets and liabilities of banks that are outside the euro area, and so on. The US dollar asset series exceeded 10 trillion dollars in 2008Q1, briefly exceeding the total assets of the US
Figure 4. Foreign currency assets and liabilities of BIS reporting banks, classified according to currency (Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics Table 5A)

chartered commercial bank sector, as shown in Shin (2012). Our model addresses the link between the strength of the dollar and global financial conditions, especially the empirical association between episodes of dollar shortages where a sharp appreciation of the US dollar coincides with bank deleveraging.

The most important modelling innovation in our paper is to depart from the conventional practice of imposing the “triple coincidence” where the national income boundary defines also the decision making unit and the currency area. Global banks straddle the traditional border, often with roundtrip flows, as shown in Shin (2012) for European global banks vis-à-vis the United States. Instead, our approach is to identify the consolidated balance sheet best able to capture the decision making unit for balance sheet management. The role of the leverage cycle and the US dollar then become clearer.

Maggiori (2010, 2011) provides a risk-sharing perspective on periodic dollar shortages which builds on the net external portfolio of the United States, whereby the United States holds risky assets of other countries but its liabilities are in the form of debt. In contrast to Maggiori’s approach (which maintains the triple coincidence), our paper is partial equilibrium
in nature and addresses just the banking system in isolation. We address the fact that within
the global banking system, banks based in the United States (many of them with European
headquarters) are net creditors to banks elsewhere (Shin (2012)).

Our analysis applies irrespective of whether the local bank is separately owned from the
global bank, or whether the local and global banks belong to the same banking organisation.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a, 2012b) provide extensive evidence using bank level data
that internal capital markets serve to reallocate funding within global banking organisations.
Further details are discussed in a BIS (2010) study that describes how the branches and
subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United States borrow from money market funds and
then channel the funds to their headquarters for on-lending to other parts of the world.
Schnabl (2012) presents empirical evidence on the international transmission of liquidity
shocks through the banking sector.

2.2 Model

To depart from the “triple coincidence” of national income boundary, decision making unit
and the currency area, our model is explicitly built around the balance sheets of international
banks that may straddle traditional national income boundaries. The model components
follow the structure of the global banking system in Figure 3. We begin first with the
regional demand for credit.

2.2.1 Loan demand

Each region has a continuum of potential borrowers. Borrowers are penniless risk-neutral
entrepreneurs with access to a project that needs 1 dollar of fixed investment and one unit of
labour input. Entrepreneurs must borrow from banks to finance the initial 1 dollar invest-
ment. The disutility of effort is distributed in the population according to the cumulative
distribution function $H(\cdot)$ with support on $[0, \infty)$. Loans are granted at date 0, and the
project realisation and repayment is due at date 1.

The entrepreneurs bear currency risk. The dollar value of the project depends on the
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. Figure 5 depicts the outcome density of the borrower’s
Figure 5. The borrower defaults when \( \theta_1 V_1 \) falls short of the notional debt \( 1 + r \). The effect of a currency appreciation is to shift the outcome density upward, lowering the default probability.

Denote by \( \theta_t \) the value of the local currency with respect to the US dollar, \( t \in \{0, 1\} \), where an increase in \( \theta_t \) denotes the appreciation of local currency. Let \( \tilde{\theta}_t \) be the date 0 expected value of \( \theta_1 \). The dollar value of borrower \( j \)'s project at date 1 follows the Merton (1974) model of credit risk, and is the random variable:

\[
\theta_1 V_1 = \exp \left( \mu (\tilde{\theta}_1) - \frac{s^2}{2} + sW_j \right)
\]

where \( W_j \) is a standard normal, \( \mu (\cdot) \) is an increasing function and \( s \) is a constant. Since borrowers are risk-neutral and have limited liability, borrower \( j \) with effort cost \( e_j \) undertakes the project if

\[
E \left( \max \{0, \theta_1 V_1 - (1 + r)\} \right) - e_j \geq 0
\]

Denote by \( e^* (r) \) the threshold effort cost level where (2) holds with equality when the loan rate is \( r \). Loan demand is the mass of entrepreneurs with effort cost below \( e^* (r) \). Denoting by \( C_d (r) \) the loan demand at interest rate \( r \), we have

\[
C_d (r) = H (e^* (r))
\]

Since \( H (\cdot) \) has full support on \([0, \infty)\), \( C_d (r) > 0 \) for all \( r > 0 \) and is strictly decreasing in \( r \).
2.2.2 Credit risk

The bank lends to many borrowers and can diversify away idiosyncratic risk. Credit risk follows the Vasicek (2002) model, a many borrower generalisation of Merton (1974). The standard normal $W_j$ in (1) is given by the linear combination:

$$W_j = \sqrt{\rho}Y + \sqrt{1-\rho}X_j$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $Y$ and $\{X_j\}$ are mutually independent standard normals. $Y$ is the common risk factor while $X_j$ is the idiosyncratic risk facing borrower $j$. The parameter $\rho \in (0,1)$ is the weight given to the common factor $Y$.

The borrower defaults when $\theta_1V_1 < 1 + r$, which can be written as

$$\sqrt{\rho}Y + \sqrt{1-\rho}X_j < -d_j$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $d_j$ is distance to default:

$$d_j = -\ln (1 + r) + \mu (\hat{\theta}_1) - \frac{s^2}{2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Thus, borrower $j$ repays the loan when $Z_j \geq 0$, where $Z_j$ is the random variable:

$$Z_j = d_j + \sqrt{\rho}Y + \sqrt{1-\rho}X_j$$

$$= -\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon) + \sqrt{\rho}Y + \sqrt{1-\rho}X_j$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $\varepsilon$ is the probability of default of borrower $j$, defined as $\varepsilon = \Phi (-d_j)$ and $\Phi$ is the standard normal c.d.f.

Conditional on $Y$, defaults are independent. In the limit where the number of borrowers becomes large the realised value of the loan portfolio with face value of 1 dollar can be written as a deterministic function of $Y$, by the law of large numbers. Defaulted loans have zero recovery value. The realised value of one dollar face value of loans is the random variable $w(Y)$ defined as:

$$w(Y) = \Pr \left( \sqrt{\rho}Y + \sqrt{1-\rho}X_j \geq \Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon) | Y \right)$$

$$= \Phi \left( \frac{Y\sqrt{\theta} - \Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon)}{\sqrt{1-\rho}} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)
Figure 6. The two charts plot the densities over realised values of a loan portfolio with face value of 1 dollar. The left hand charts plots densities when $\rho = 0.1$ and $\varepsilon$ is varied from 0.1 to 0.3. The right hand chart plots densities when $\varepsilon = 0.2$ and $\rho$ varies from 0.01 to 0.3.

The c.d.f. of $w$ is then given by

$$
\Pr(w \leq z) = \Pr(Y \leq w^{-1}(z)) = \Phi(w^{-1}(z)) = \Phi\left(\frac{\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon) + \sqrt{1 - \rho} \Phi^{-1}(z)}{\sqrt{\rho}}\right)
$$

Figure 6 plots the density over realised values of 1 dollar face value of loans, and shows how the density shifts to changes in the default probability $\varepsilon$ (left hand panel) or to changes in $\rho$ (right hand panel). From (9), the c.d.f. of $w$ is increasing in $\varepsilon$, so that higher values of $\varepsilon$ imply a first degree stochastic dominance shift left for the asset realisation density. Since $\varepsilon$ increases with expected dollar appreciation, exchange rates have a direct impact on the credit environment in our model.

### 2.2.3 Bank leverage

Banks are risk-neutral price takers with a fixed, exogenous endowment of own funds. Each bank chooses total lending to maximise the market value of equity, subject to two constraints.
The first is the balance sheet identity at date 0, that lending is the sum of own funds and borrowed funds. The second constraint is a leverage constraint.

We solve the bank’s problem in two steps. In the first step, we solve for leverage from a contracting problem. Then, risk-neutrality and price taking means that loan supply is the maximum lending consistent with the leverage constraint and the balance sheet identity. Finally, the loan rate $r$ is solved from market clearing.

As noted by Merton (1974), the market value of debt is the difference between the notional value of debt and the implicit option value of default. The market value of equity is then given by

$$\text{Market value of equity} = \text{Asset value} - \text{Debt value}$$

$$= \text{Asset value} - \text{Notional debt} + \text{Option value of default}$$

The contract between the bank and its creditors addresses the moral hazard problem as in Adrian and Shin (2014) where the bank can opt for a portfolio of riskier loans that has lower expected value but a higher option value of default. We limit consideration to debt contracts only. The contract limits the bank’s leverage and thereby caps the option value of default.

Formally, suppose that each regional bank has the binary choice between a portfolio of good loans and a portfolio of bad loans. Good loans have a probability of default $\varepsilon$ and parameter $\rho > 0$. We denote the c.d.f. of one dollar’s face value of good loans as $F_G(\cdot)$. Thus, $F_G$ is given by (9).

Bad loans have a higher probability of default $\varepsilon + k$, where $k > 0$ is a constant. The c.d.f. of the realised value of one dollar face value of bad loans is denoted by $F_B(\cdot)$. We assume that $F_G$ cuts $F_B$ precisely once from below. In other words, the bad loans have a lower expected payoff, but they have greater dispersion of outcomes.

A bank is both a lender and a borrower. Denote by $\varphi$ the bank’s notional debt per one dollar face value of its loan portfolio. The bank defaults if the realised value of one dollar’s face value of loans falls below $\varphi$. Therefore, $\varphi$ is the strike price of the embedded put option arising from limited liability. The bank faces a leverage cap through an upper limit on $\varphi$.

Denote by $\pi_G(\varphi)$ the option value of default given notional debt $\varphi$ under the good portfolio, and denote by $\pi_B(\varphi)$ the option value under the bad portfolio. The incentive
compatibility constraint for the bank to choose the good portfolio is

\[ E(w_G) - [\varphi - \pi_G(\varphi)] \geq E(w_B) - [\varphi - \pi_B(\varphi)] \] (10)

where \( E(w_G) \) is the expected realised value of one dollar’s face value of good loans and \( E(w_B) \) is the analogous expected realised value for bad loans. Writing \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) = \pi_B(\varphi) - \pi_G(\varphi) \), (10) can be written more simply as

\[ \Delta \pi(\varphi) \leq k \] (11)

The left hand side is the additional option value to default from the bad portfolio and the right hand side is the difference \( k \) in expected realised values between the good and bad portfolios. Incentive compatibility entails keeping leverage low enough that the higher option value to default does not exceed the greater expected payoff of the good portfolio. Our solution rests on being able to solve for a unique leverage level given by the following lemma.

**Lemma 1** There is a unique \( \varphi \) that solves \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) = k \).

We prove Lemma 1. From risk neutrality, \( \pi_G(\varphi) \) is the expected payoff of the put option on one dollar face value of loans with strike price \( \varphi \)

\[ \pi_G(\varphi) = \int_0^\varphi (\varphi - s) f_G(s) \, ds \]

\[ = \varphi F_G(\varphi) - \int_0^\varphi s f_G(s) \, ds \] (12)

\[ = \int_0^\varphi F_G(s) \, ds \] (13)

where \( f_G(\cdot) \) is the density of the good portfolio and (13) follows from integration by parts. Hence, \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) = \int_0^\varphi [F_B(s) - F_G(s)] \, ds \). Since \( F_G(z) \) cuts \( F_B(z) \) once from below, \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) \) is single-peaked. From (12), \( \lim_{\varphi \to 1} \Delta \pi(\varphi) = k \), so that \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) \) approaches \( k \) from above as \( \varphi \to 1 \). Since \( \varphi < 1 \) for any bank with positive equity, we have a unique solution to \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) = k \). This proves the lemma.

Lemma 1 ties down the leverage of regional banks as a function of the payoff fundamentals and the expected appreciation of the local currency.
2.2.4 Loan supply

We now solve for loan supply by regional banks. The notation follows Figure 7. All banks are risk-neutral price takers and take \( i, f \) and \( r \) as given when making their lending decisions. Regional bank \( i \) has own funds \( E_{R,i} > 0 \), which is exogenous. Bank \( i \)'s loan supply is \( C_{is} \).

Bank \( i \)'s optimisation problem is to choose \( C_{is} \) to maximise its market value of equity:

\[
C_{is} \cdot (E(w) - (\varphi - \pi(\varphi)))
\]

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint \( \Delta \pi(\varphi) \leq k \), its exogenous own funds \( E_{R,i} \) and the balance sheet identity \( C_{is} = E_{R,i} + L_i \), where \( L_i \) is the dollar funding obtained from global banks. From the balance sheet identity, \( L_i \) is determined when \( C_{is} \) is chosen, and so we may limit attention to \( C_{is} \) as the sole decision variable.

Since the bank is risk-neutral, the IC constraint binds and \( \varphi \) is the solution identified in Lemma 1. By definition,

\[
\varphi = (1 + f) L_i / (1 + r) C_{is}
\]

From the balance sheet identity \( C_i = E_{R,i} + L_i \), loan supply of bank \( i \) is given by

\[
C_{is} = \frac{E_{R,i}}{1 - \frac{1+r}{1+f} \varphi}
\]

Aggregating across all regional banks, the aggregate loan supply by the regional banks is

\[
C_s = \frac{E_R}{1 - \frac{1+r}{1+f} \varphi}
\]
where $E_R$ is the aggregate own funds of all regional banks. Equation (17) is not yet a complete solution, as $f$ is endogenous and determined by market clearing of the wholesale lending market.

Under the incentive compatibility constraint, the asset realisations follow the distribution $F_G(.)$, so that the probability of default by the bank is given by $F_G(\varphi)$, where $\varphi$ is the solution given by Lemma 1. Denoting by $\alpha$ the bank’s probability of default, we have $\alpha = F_G(\varphi)$ so that

$$\alpha = \Phi \left( \frac{\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon) + \sqrt{1 - \rho} \Phi^{-1}(\varphi)}{\sqrt{\rho}} \right)$$

(18)

Since $\varphi$ is uniquely solved by Lemma 1, and $\rho$ is a parameter of the contracting problem, $\alpha$ is also uniquely defined once we solve for the probability of default $\varepsilon$ of the corporate borrowers, which depends on the exchange rate.

2.2.5 Global banking system

We now introduce global banks in a “double-decker” version of the Vasicek model. There are many regions and each global bank has a diversified portfolio of loans across many regions. However, the global banks bear global risk that cannot be diversified away.
The unit square in Figure 8 represents the population of borrowers across all regions. Regional bank $k$ holds a portfolio that is diversified against idiosyncratic shocks, but not to regional shocks. Global banks hold a portfolio of loans to regional banks, and is diversified against regional shocks, but it faces undiversifiable global risk.

In (7), we introduced the random variable $Z_j$ that determined whether a particular borrower $j$ defaults or not. We now introduce a subscript $k$ to indicate the region that the borrower belongs to. Thus, let

$$Z_{kj} \equiv -\Phi^{-1}(\epsilon) + \sqrt{\rho} Y_k + \sqrt{1-\rho} X_{kj}$$

where

$$Y_k = \sqrt{\beta} G + \sqrt{1-\beta} R_k$$

In (20), the risk factor $Y_k$ is decomposed into a regional risk factor $R_k$ that affects all borrowers in region $k$ and a global risk factor $G$. The random variables $G, \{R_k\}$ and $\{X_{kj}\}$ are mutually independent standard normals.

The credit risk borne by a global bank arises from the possibility (which happens with probability $\alpha$) that a regional bank defaults on the cross-border loan granted by the global bank. Although each regional bank has a diversified portfolio against the idiosyncratic risk of its regional borrowers, it bears the risk $Y_k$.

A global bank has a fully-diversified portfolio across regions, and it can diversify away the regional risks $R_k$. A regional bank $k$ defaults when $w_G(Y_k) < \varphi$, or

$$Y_k < w^{-1}_G(\varphi) = \Phi^{-1}(\epsilon + \sqrt{1-\rho} \Phi^{-1}(\varphi))$$

$$= \Phi^{-1}(\alpha)$$

Equivalently, regional bank $k$ defaults when $\xi_k < 0$, where $\xi_k$ is the random variable:

$$\xi_k \equiv -\Phi^{-1}(\alpha) + Y_k$$

$$= -\Phi^{-1}(\alpha) + \sqrt{\beta} G + \sqrt{1-\beta} R_k$$

Note the formal symmetry between (22) and the expression for $Z_j$ for the regional bank in (7). The global bank faces borrowers who default with probability $\alpha$, whereas the regional
bank faces borrowers who default with probability \( \varepsilon \). The global bank faces uncertainty with both a diversifiable element \( R_k \) and undiversifiable element \( G \), whereas the regional bank faces diversifiable risk \( X_j \) and undiversifiable risk \( Y \). The parameter \( \beta \) plays the analogous role for the global bank as parameter \( \rho \) does for the regional bank.

2.2.6 Global bank leverage

The solution for global bank leverage is similar to that for regional banks. The global bank has a binary choice between a good portfolio and a bad portfolio. The good portfolio consists of loans with default probability \( \alpha \) but where \( \beta = 0 \), so that correlation in defaults are eliminated. The bad portfolio consists of loans with a higher probability of default \( \alpha + h \), for constant \( h > 0 \), and non-zero correlation of default \( \beta' > 0 \). The greater correlation in defaults generates dispersion in the asset realisation and hence higher option value of default. If the bank chooses the bad portfolio, the realised value of one dollar face value of loans is the random variable \( w_B(G) \) where

\[
 w_B(G) = \Pr \left( \sqrt{\beta'} G + \sqrt{1-\beta'} R_j \geq \Phi^{-1}(\alpha + h) | G \right) 
= \Phi \left( \frac{G\sqrt{\beta'} - \Phi^{-1}(\alpha + h)}{\sqrt{1-\beta'}} \right) 
\]

The c.d.f. of \( w_B \) is denoted \( F_B(z) \), and given by

\[
\Pr(w_B \leq z) = \Pr(G \leq w_B^{-1}(z)) 
= \Phi(w_B^{-1}(z)) 
= \Phi \left( \frac{\Phi^{-1}(\alpha + h) + \sqrt{1-\beta'} \Phi^{-1}(z)}{\sqrt{\beta'}} \right) 
\]

If the bank chooses the good portfolio, the default probability is \( \alpha \) and correlation in defaults is zero. The c.d.f. of the good portfolio realisation is obtained from (24) by setting \( h = 0 \) and taking \( \beta' \to 0 \). In this limit, the numerator of the expression inside the brackets in (24) is positive when \( z > 1 - \alpha \) and negative when \( z < 1 - \alpha \). Thus, the realisation of the good portfolio has c.d.f. given by

\[
F_G(z) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } z < 1 - \alpha \\
1 & \text{if } z \geq 1 - \alpha 
\end{cases} 
\]
The good portfolio allows full diversification by the bank.

Denote by $\psi$ the notional debt ratio of the global bank; that is, $\psi$ is the default point of the global bank for one dollar face value of loans, and hence the strike price of the implicit option from limited liability. The incentive compatibility constraint for the global bank to choose the good portfolio is

$$E(w_G) - [\psi - \pi_G(\psi)] \geq E(w_B) - [\psi - \pi_B(\psi)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

where $E(w_G)$ is the expected payoff of the good portfolio and $\pi_G(\psi)$ is the put option value with strike $\psi$ under the good portfolio. $E(w_B)$ and $\pi_B(\psi)$ are defined analogously for the bad portfolio. Writing $\Delta \pi(\psi) = \pi_B(\psi) - \pi_G(\psi)$, (26) can be written as

$$\Delta \pi(\psi) \leq h$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

Incentive compatibility entails keeping leverage low enough that the higher option value to default does not exceed the greater expected payoff of the good portfolio.

**Lemma 2** There is a unique $\psi$ that solves $\Delta \pi(\psi) = h$, where $\psi < 1 - \alpha$.

Lemma 2 is the global bank analogue of Lemma 1, and the proof is in the Appendix. The one difference is that $\psi < 1 - \alpha$, so that the liabilities of the global bank are risk-free and earn the risk-free rate $i$. The global bank has enough own funds to absorb the credit loss $\alpha$, so that its liabilities are risk-free even though its assets are risky. The fact that global banks can borrow at the risk-free rate is reminiscent of Geanakoplos (2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012), who also have the feature that borrowers’ probability of default is zero, but for reasons that are different from our model. However, the common thread is that actual default by the bank does not happen precisely because the contract addresses the possibility of default by the bank by limiting leverage.

**2.2.7 Closed-form solution**

We can now solve the model fully. For the global bank, the good portfolio has payoff $1 - \alpha$ with certainty since defaults are independent. Since the bank has zero probability of default
whenever $\psi < 1 - \alpha$, Lemma 2 implies that the global bank’s probability of default is zero, so that $i$ is the (exogenous) dollar risk-free rate. Since $\psi = (1 + i) M / (1 + f) L$ and from the balance sheet identity $E_G + M = L$, the global bank’s supply of wholesale lending is

$$L_S = \frac{E_G}{1 - \frac{1 + f}{1 + i} \psi} \quad (28)$$

The market clearing condition for $L$ is

$$\frac{E_R}{1 + f} \cdot \frac{1}{\phi} - 1 = \frac{E_G}{1 - \frac{1 + f}{1 + i} \psi} \quad (29)$$

The funding rate $f$ can be solved as

$$1 + f = \frac{1}{\mu \frac{1}{1 + r} \phi + (1 - \mu) \frac{\psi}{1 + i}} \quad (30)$$

where $\mu = E_G / (E_G + E_R)$. Substituting into (17) and (28), we can solve for aggregate loan supply to entrepreneurs as a function of the regional lending rate $r$:

$$C_s (r) = \frac{E_G + E_R}{1 - \frac{1 + f}{1 + i} \phi \psi} \quad (31)$$

The dollar lending rate $r$ is solved by equating loan supply (31) with loan demand $C_d (r)$ given in (3).

Finally, we close the model by solving for the spot exchange rate at date 0, denoted by $\theta_0$, by positing exogenous imperfect substitutability of currencies in the spirit of the portfolio balance model (see Branson and Henderson (1985)). Figure 9 depicts the determination of $\theta_0$.

Corporate borrowers have currency mismatch as depicted in Figure 3. Total dollar credit is $C$, so that corporate borrowers’ demand for dollars at the date 0 spot market is a function of the spot rate and expected appreciation. Denote by $-C \left( \theta_0, \beta_1 \right)$ the spot demand for dollars by corporates. We posit an exogenous demand for dollars on the spot market due to

---

3The portfolio balance approach to exchange rates has traditionally left the imperfect substitutability between currencies unmodeled. Gabaix and Maggiori (2013) provide a recent microfoundation in terms of dealer inventories.
Given these exogenous elements, we can solve the model uniquely. First, $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are uniquely determined by the underlying parameters of the contracting problem, as stated in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. The probability of default $\varepsilon$ of the borrowers’ project is determined given the expected exchange rate appreciation. Finally, the lending rate $r$ is determined by market-clearing. Due to the full support assumption for $H(\cdot)$, the demand for loans is positive and strictly decreasing for all $r > 0$. Thus, market-clearing occurs for positive lending and the lending rate $r$ is uniquely determined. All other quantities can then be derived from $r$ and other exogenous parameters.

**Proposition 3** Total regional lending is

$$C = \frac{E_G + E_R}{1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varphi \psi}}$$

(33)
and total cross-border bank-to-bank lending is

$$L = E_G + E_R \cdot \frac{1+i}{1+i} \varphi \psi \frac{1 - \frac{1+i}{1+i} \varphi \psi}{1 - \frac{1+i}{1+i} \varphi \psi}$$

(34)

where \( r \) is the unique solution to the market clearing condition \( H(e^*(r)) = C_s(r) \) and \( i \) is the exogenous risk-free US dollar interest rate.

2.3 Risk capacity of global banking system

In our model, the aggregate credit risk generated by the borrowers’ projects has to be absorbed by the global banking system, either directly by the regional banks or indirectly by the global banks who lend to regional banks. When the fundamental risk increases, the leverage constraints of the banks become tighter. Given the very general nature of the contracting problem for the regional banks in our model, we cannot prove in general that an increase in default risk \( \varepsilon \) leads to universal deleveraging by all banks. However, we can show that any change in the fundamental risk imposes a joint restriction on the leverage of the regional and global banks taken together.

In particular, we can define “ iso-risk” curves that put bounds on bank leverage. When \( \varepsilon \) increases, either due to an increase in fundamental risk or due to an expected appreciation of the US dollar, the global banking system moves on to a lower iso-risk curve, so that either global banks deleverage, or local banks deleverage or both. The following result states the property formally. Figure 10 illustrates the result.

**Proposition 4** There is a function \( B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) \) which is increasing in all three arguments such that \( B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) = 0 \) for any solution \( (\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) \).

The function \( B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) \) establishes bounds on \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) for any given level of fundamental risk \( \varepsilon \), and hence we could dub the indifference curves generated by the \( B \) function as “iso-risk curves”. Since \( B \) is increasing in all three arguments, the boundary \( B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) = 0 \) is negatively sloped in \( (\varphi, \psi) \)-space as shown in Figure 10.

The \( B \) function is defined as follows. Equation (18) gives the default probability \( \alpha \) of the regional banks as an increasing function of \( \varepsilon \) and \( \varphi \), which we can denote as \( A(\varepsilon, \varphi) \).
Figure 10. **Risk capacity of global banking system.** This figure shows the impact of increased default risk from $\varepsilon$ to $\varepsilon'$ on the leverage of global and regional banks.

This function is increasing in both components. Meanwhile, Lemma 2 guarantees a unique solution to the global bank’s incentive compatibility constraint $\Delta \pi (\psi) = h$, which can be written as

$$\int_{0}^{\psi} \Phi \left( \frac{\Phi^{-1}(\alpha + h) + \sqrt{1 - \Phi^{-1}(s)}}{\sqrt{\beta}} \right) ds = h$$

(35)

The left hand side of (35) is an increasing function of $\psi$ and $\alpha$, which we write as $\hat{B}(\psi, \alpha)$. Then, the function $B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi)$ in Proposition 4 is defined by substituting $\alpha = A(\varepsilon, \varphi)$ into $\hat{B}(\psi, \alpha)$. Thus,

$$B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) \equiv \hat{B}(\psi, A(\varepsilon, \varphi)) - h$$

(36)

Any solution $(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi)$ then satisfies $B(\varepsilon, \varphi, \psi) = 0$, which proves Proposition 4.

When $\varepsilon$ increases, either due to an expected appreciation of the US dollar, or to an increase in fundamental risks in the world economy, then either global banks deleverage, or regional banks deleverage, or both.
2.4 Comparative Statics

In preparation for our empirical investigation, we explore some implications of our model. The expressions for total cross-border lending (34) can be expressed in long hand as

\[
\text{Total cross-border lending} = \frac{\text{Global and weighted regional bank capital}}{1 - \text{spread} \times \frac{\text{regional leverage}}{\text{global leverage}}}.
\]

(37)

Here, \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are interpreted as normalised leverage measures (regional and global) that lie in the unit interval \((0, 1)\).

An implication of our model is that both the level of bank leverage (which determines the rate at which one dollar’s increase in bank capital is turned into lending) and the change in the leverage (which determines the lending based on existing, or infra-marginal, bank capital) should enter as “supply push” determinants of banking flows. We will examine the evidence shortly.

A distinctive prediction of our model which sets it apart from existing macro models of capital flows is the comparative statics of exchange rate changes. When the local currency is expected to appreciate, \( \varepsilon \) declines. In effect, expected currency appreciation has the same impact as a decline in the credit risk associated with borrowers’ projects. Since \( \varphi \) is a decreasing function of \( \varepsilon \), exchange rate changes feed directly into the risk-taking of banks and their leverage decisions.

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Sample and Variable Definitions

Our sample for the panel investigation draws on data from 46 countries, encompassing both developed economies and emerging/developing economies, but excluding offshore financial centres. Since we wish to analyze the global banking channel, the criterion for inclusion is whether foreign banks play an economically significant role in the country’s financial system. In addition to developed economies, we select countries with the largest foreign bank penetration, as measured by the number of foreign banks and by the share of domestic banking...
assets held by foreign-owned local institutions from the Claessens, van Horen, Gurcanlar and Mercado (2008) dataset.

The countries included in our sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

Our definition of banking flows $\Delta L$ is the growth (log difference) in cross-border loans of BIS-reporting banks on banking sector counterparties in a particular country, as measured by the difference between Table 7A (all borrowers) and Table 7B (non-bank borrowers) in the BIS Locational Statistics. Global banks account for most of these international exposures. Since European banks have a pivotal role in the transmission of global liquidity (Shin, 2012) and the US dollar is the currency underpinning the global banking system, our variable is a good empirical counterpart to our model setting built around banking claims of global banks that use US dollar wholesale funding. The key organisational criteria of the BIS locational statistics data are the country of residence of the reporting banks and their counterparties as well as the recording of all positions on a gross basis, including those vis-à-vis own affiliates. This makes the locational statistics appropriate for measuring the role of banks in the intermediation of international capital flows and lending flows.

The left panel of Figure 11 plots the cross-border claims of BIS-reporting banks from the BIS Locational Statistics Table 7A on counterparties listed on the right. The series have been normalised to equal 100 in March 2003. Although the borrowers have wide geographical spread, we see a synchronised boom in cross-border lending before the recent financial crisis.

The right panel of Figure 11 plots the leverage of the US broker dealer sector from 1990. Leverage increases gradually up to 2007, and then falls abruptly with the onset of the financial crisis. The right panel also shows how US broker dealer leverage is closely (negatively) associated with the risk measure given by the VIX index of the implied volatility.

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4See, for instance, the E.16 statistics release (http://www.ffiec.gov/e16.htm)
Figure 11. Cross-border bank claims, leverage and VIX. The left panel plots cross-border claims of BIS reporting country banks on borrowers in countries as listed (from BIS banking statistics table 7A). The series are normalized to 100 in March 2003. The right panel plots log of VIX lagged by one quarter, and leverage of the US broker dealer sector (inverted) from the US Flow of Funds. Leverage is defined as (equity + total liabilities)/equity.

in S&P 500 stock index option prices from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). This evidence corroborates the findings in Adrian and Shin (2010, 2012) who pointed to the close association between the leverage of the Wall Street investment banks and the VIX index.

3.1.1 Global Factors

Our solution highlights the leverage and (book) equity of global banks that facilitate cross-border bank lending. As for the leverage of the global banks, our empirical counterpart should ideally be measured as the leverage of the broker dealer subsidiaries of the European global banks that facilitate cross-border lending. However, the reported balance sheet data for European banks are consolidated numbers at the holding company level that includes the much larger commercial banking unit, rather than the wholesale investment banking subsidiary alone. For the reasons discussed in Adrian and Shin (2010), broker dealers and commercial banks differ in important ways in their balance sheet management. The broker dealer sector much more closely mirrors the wholesale funding operations of the global banks. For this reason, we use instead the leverage of the US broker dealer sector from the Flow of Funds series published by the Federal Reserve as our empirical proxy for global bank leverage.
(Global Leverage) and global bank leverage growth (Global Leverage growth). To the extent
that US broker dealers are influenced by the same forces as the broker dealer subsidiaries of
the European global banks, we may expect to capture the main forces at work.

The other global variable predicted by the theory is the growth in the equity of global
banks. Non-US global banks, especially European global banks, were active in US dollar
intermediation, as mentioned above. To capture the role of global banks’ equity, we use the
change in the total book value of equity of the largest (top 10) non-US commercial banks
by assets from Bankscope as a proxy for the growth in equity of international banks (Global
Equity growth). Ideally, we would like to capture the equity of the broker dealer subsidiary
of the bank, rather than the equity of the bank as a whole. However, provided that the book
equity devoted to the wholesale banking business remains a steady proportion of the bank’s
overall equity, the use of our proxy would be justified. Bankscope has historical banking
data from 1997, hence the variable Global Equity growth is available since 1998.

3.1.2 Local Factors

Our solution also allows a role for the leverage and equity of local banks. As a proxy for
local leverage we use the ratio of bank assets to capital in levels (Local Leverage) and growth
(Local Leverage growth) from the World Bank WDI database. As a proxy for local equity
growth, we use the commercial banks’ net income to yearly averaged total assets (ROA)
(Local Equity growth) from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure Dataset.

By using this proxy, we implicitly assume that a constant fraction of the earnings is retained
as equity.

A distinctive feature of our model is the impact of exchange rate changes on capital flows.
We include the log difference of the real exchange rate ($\Delta RER$), where RER is computed
as the log of nominal exchange rate* (US CPI/local CPI). The nominal exchange rate is in
units of national currency per U.S. Dollar (from the IMF’s IFS database). Bruno and Shin
(2013) find in vector autoregression (VAR) exercises that a decline in the US Fed Funds rate
is followed by an increase in US broker dealer leverage, an acceleration of capital flows and
a depreciation of the US dollar.

In addition to the variables explicitly modeled in our theoretical framework, we also
include a number of other control variables. The annual growth rate in money supply \((\Delta M2)\) is measured as the difference in end-of-year totals relative to the level of M2 (from the World Bank WDI). Our rationale for including the growth in M2 arises from the domestic monetary implications of capital flows. The regional banks in Figure 7 do not have a currency mismatch: they raise US dollar funding and lending in dollars. However, the local borrowers - typically non-financial corporates - may have a currency mismatch either to hedge export receivables or to engage in outright speculation on local currency appreciation. One way for them to do so is to borrow in US dollars and then deposit the local currency proceeds into the domestic banking system. Such deposits would be captured as corporate deposits, a component of M2. Thus, we would predict that banking inflows are associated with increases in M2.

\(\Delta GDP\) and \(Inflation\) are the country percentage changes in GDP and Inflation, respectively (data from the WEO). Faster growing economies could have greater demand for credit whereas higher inflation could limit the supply of credit. \(\Delta Debt/GDP\) is the change in government gross debt to GDP (from WEO) and is another factor that potentially affects credit conditions.

Finally, our model also predicts that cross-border lending is increasing in the interest rate spread between the funding rate \(f\) and the risk-free interest rate of the wholesale funding currency \(i\). We construct the variable \(\Delta Interest\ Spread\) as the difference between the local lending rate and the US Fed Fund rate (from the IMF IFS) and then take the differences between quarters \(t\) and \(t - 1\).

The variables \(\Delta L\), \(\Delta Debt/GDP\), \(Inflation\), and \(Local Equity growth\) are winsorised at the 2.5\% percentile to limit the effect of the outliers. The sample period spans from the first quarter of 1996 (the first date covered in Table 7 of the BIS locational data) to the last quarter of 2011, but the coverage of years and countries varies depending on data availability.

### 3.2 Panel Regressions for Bank Capital Flows

The specification follows our closed-form solution for banking sector capital flows given by (37). Our panel regressions are with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors at
the country level:

\[
\Delta L_{c,q,y} = \beta_0 + \beta_i \cdot \text{Global Factor } (i)_{(q-1 \text{ or } y-1)} + \beta_j \cdot \text{Local Factor } (c,j)_{(q-1 \text{ or } y-1)} \\
+ \beta_k \cdot \Delta \text{Interest Spread}_{c,q-1} + \epsilon_{c,q}
\]  

(38)

where

- $\Delta L_{c,q,y}$ is the growth in cross-border loans vis-à-vis the bank sector in country $c$ and in quarter $q$ of year $y$, as given by the quarterly log difference in the external loans of BIS reporting country banks in country $c$ between quarters $q-1$ and $q$;

- Global Factors $i$ encompass the leverage of the US broker dealer sector in level ($Global \text{ Leverage}$) (at quarter $q-1$) and its log difference between quarters $q-2$ and $q-1$ ($Global \text{ Leverage growth}$), and the log difference in equity of global banks between years $y-2$ and $y-1$ ($Global \text{ Equity growth}$);

- Local Factors $j$ in country $c$ encompass the bank assets to capital ratio (at year $y-1$) and its growth (between year $y-2$ and $y-1$) ($Local \text{ Leverage}$ and $Local \text{ Leverage growth}$), bank return on assets ($Local \text{ Equity growth}$). Other local variables are $\Delta RER$, $\Delta M2$, $\Delta GDP$, $\text{Inflation}$, and $\Delta Debt/GDP$, as described in the data section. In addition we use country-fixed effects to control for any additional country-level effect not captured by our control variables, such as unobserved changes in credit demand at the country level.

- $\Delta Interest \text{ Spread}$ is the first difference in the spread between the local lending rate and the US Fed Fund rate.

To reduce endogeneity concerns and maximise the period coverage, all independent variables are lagged by one quarter (if at quarterly frequency) or by four quarters (if at yearly frequency). We start running regressions separately for the “level” and “growth” variables and then show results where all variables are included in the same specification. The results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. **Determinants of banking sector capital flows.** This table reports panel regressions for banking sector capital flows with country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the quarterly log difference of external loans of BIS reporting banks as given by the difference in the values between Table 7A - Table 7B of the BIS Locational Statistics. Global Leverage is the leverage of the US broker dealer sector and Global Leverage growth is its quarterly growth. Global Equity growth is the change in the dollar value of equity of the top 10 non-US banks. Local Leverage and Local Leverage growth are the bank assets to capital ratio in levels and its growth, respectively. Local Equity growth is the commercial banks’ net income to total assets ratio. ΔInterest Spread is the first difference in the spread between the local lending rate and the US Fed Fund rate. Other local variables are the log difference of the real exchange rate, GDP growth, Debt to GDP ratio growth, growth of M2 money stock, and Inflation. p-values are reported in parantheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

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Column (1) is the specification that includes the variables Global Leverage and Local Leverage. Only Global Leverage is positive and significant. Column (2) is the specification that includes the variables Global Equity Growth and Local Equity Growth, where both variables are positive and significant. Column (3) is the specification that includes the variables Global Leverage Growth and Local Leverage Growth, where only Global Leverage Growth is positive and significant. Column (4) is the specification that includes all variables. This specification shows that Global Leverage (both in levels and growth) continues remaining highly significant, together with Local Equity Growth.

The additional local variables in Table 1 enter with the predicted signs, but they do not diminish the role of Global Leverage. Particularly notable is the variable RER which gives the price of dollars in local currency in real terms, so that a fall in RER represents an appreciation of the local currency. We see that the coefficient on $\Delta RER$ is the only variable that is negative and highly significant in every specification, indicating that a real appreciation between quarter $q - 1$ to quarter $q$ is associated with acceleration in bank capital flows between quarter $q$ to quarter $q + 1$. Thus, an appreciation of the local currency leads to an acceleration of capital inflows, thereby confirming the main distinctive prediction of our model.

The expansion of the domestic money stock is also associated with capital flows, as consistently found in earlier studies of capital flows to emerging economies (for instance, Berg and Patillo (1999)). In addition, higher GDP growth, proxing for high domestic demand conditions, is positively associated with banking flows, whereas the deterioration of lending (higher inflation) and public debt conditions act as push factors against cross-border lending. However, these variables are not statistically significant in every specification.

Finally, we observe that the coefficient of the $\Delta$Interest Spread is positive and significant as predicted by our theory in specification (5) when other variables are not included. However, it loses significance when used in conjunction with all other variables (column 6). Overall, Table 1 reveals the significant role of global bank leverage and exchange rate changes.
3.3 Robustness tests and additional results

We complement our panel regressions by examining dynamic panel Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) methods due to Arellano and Bover (1995). The panel GMM estimator can be used to control for the dynamic nature of the banking flows-banking leverage relationships, while accounting for other sources of endogeneity, such as credit demand from local banks, funding and lending costs (monetary policy) and other local country characteristics. The results are given in the Appendix in Section A.1. They show that Global Leverage and $\Delta RER$ continue remaining highly significant.

In Section A.2, we present panel regressions using alternative specifications. In one set of regressions, we include bank leverage terms computed in terms of market capitalisation. We follow Adrian, Moech and Shin (2013) and we define enterprise value leverage ($M_k Global Leverage$) as the enterprise value divided by the market capitalisation of US broker dealers. We show that book leverage remains significant, whereas enterprise value leverage does not. One way to understand our results is to note that enterprise value addresses the question “how much is the bank worth?”, whereas capital flows address the question “how much does the bank lend?”. Section A.2 also reports results where VIX is used instead of broker dealer leverage, and show that VIX is a good proxy for leverage. These results provide a point of contact with Forbes and Warnock (2012) who have highlighted the explanatory power of the VIX index for gross capital flows, and are strongly suggested by Figure 11, where fluctuations in the VIX Index are ( inversely) associated with shifts in bank leverage.

Section A.3 addresses the extent to which global “supply push” variables are responsible for driving cross-border banking sector flows, in comparison to the local “demand pull” factors. By comparing the $R^2$ statistics obtained with the full set of time fixed effects, we can ascertain how much of the variation in the data are accounted for by local factors and by global factors. We find that local factors account for only a modest amount of the variation, while global factors account for an overwhelming part of the variation.
4 Concluding Remarks

Our framework has examined global liquidity in terms of the aggregate cross-border lending through the banking sector. The evidence in our paper suggests that the global “supply push” factors in the form of the leverage cycle of the global banks have been the key determinants of global liquidity before 2008. Our findings reinforce the argument in Borio and Disyatat (2011), Obstfeld (2012a, 2012b) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) on the importance of gross capital flows between countries in determining financial conditions, and complement the net external asset approach of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007), and other studies based on portfolio flows (such as Hau and Rey (2009). Our approach is in keeping with the renewed focus on the banking sector in the European context (see Allen, Beck, Carletti, Lane, Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011), Lane (2013) and Lane and Pels (2011)).

Our findings open up a number of avenues for future research, both theoretical and empirical. We have highlighted the role of financial intermediaries in their use of wholesale bank funding. Cross-border banks intermediate such funding, and the composition of their liabilities can be expected to reflect the state of the financial cycle and risk premiums ruling in the financial system. Thus, future work on early warning indicators may usefully draw on the behavior of the banking sector over the cycle.  

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5The post-crisis evidence is updated in Gourinchas, Govillot and Rey (2010) and Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012)

6See Rose and Spiegel (2009), Shin and Shin (2010) and Hahm, Shin and Shin (2013) for empirical analyses of this issue.
A Appendix

Proof of Lemma 2. From (13), \( \Delta \pi (\psi) = \int_0^\psi [F_B(s) - F_G(s)] \, ds \), so that

\[
\Delta \pi (\psi) = \begin{cases} 
\int_0^\psi F_B(s) \, ds & \text{if } \psi < 1 - \alpha \\
1 - \alpha & \text{if } \psi \geq 1 - \alpha \\
\int_0^{1 - \alpha} F_B(s) \, ds - \int_1^\psi [1 - F_B(s)] \, ds & \text{if } \psi < 1 - \alpha
\end{cases}
\]

(39)

Thus \( \Delta \pi (\psi) \) is single-peaked, reaching its maximum at \( \psi = 1 - \alpha \). From (12),

\[
\lim_{\psi \to 1} \Delta \pi (\psi) = h
\]

so that \( \Delta \pi (\psi) \) approaches \( h \) from above as \( \psi \to 1 \). Since \( \psi < 1 \) for a bank with positive equity, there is a unique solution to \( \Delta \pi (\psi) = h \) where the solution is in the range where \( \Delta \pi (\psi) \) is increasing. Therefore \( \psi < 1 - \alpha \). This proves the lemma.

Robustness tests and additional results

A.1 Endogeneity

We examine a dynamic system GMM that uses a stacked system consisting of both first-differenced and level equations. In the system GMM regression we treat all the regressors as endogenous and include one lag of the dependent variable \( \Delta L \). In order to avoid overfitting and instrument proliferation, we use one lag (the first quarter lag or the first annual lag depending on whether the variable has a quarter or annual frequency) and combine instruments into smaller sets. By adopting this specification, we end up using 17 or 27 instruments depending on the specification implemented. Table 2 shows two specifications: one that includes Global Leverage and Local Leverage only (column 1) and one where all global and local variables are included (column 2).\(^7\) The results show that Global Leverage and \( \Delta RER \) continue remaining highly significant.

\(^7\)The AR(1) test yields a p-value of 0.000 in both cases. The AR(2) test yields a p-value of 0.697 in the first specification and a p-value of 0.871 in the second specification, which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. The results also reveal a Hansen J-statistic.
Table 2. Robustness Tests. Columns 1 and 2 present results from a test for endogeneity by using the dynamic panel GMM methods of Arellano and Bover (1995). Column 3 reports results with the market value of leverage added to the specification. In column 4, VIX is used in lieu of the broker dealer leverage. Column 5 includes the variable Interoffice Growth in the benchmark specification. Column 6 excludes the post-2008 period. Column 7 adds to the benchmark specification the dummy variable Domestic Crisis, which is equal to 1 in each year a country experiences a banking sector crisis. Additional controls include the log difference of the real exchange rate, GDP growth, Debt to GDP ratio growth, growth of M2 money stock, and Inflation. p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>0.005**</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
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<td>[0.048]</td>
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<td>[0.000]</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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A.2 Additional Specifications

We examine alternative specifications to gauge robustness of our panel regression findings. In one set of regressions, we use leverage defined in terms of banking sector market capitalisation instead of book equity, and also examine VIX as a proxy for the leverage of the global banks. We find that book equity performs best, not the leverage based on market cap. This result is consistent with Adrian, Moench and Shin (2013). We also find that VIX is a good proxy for leverage.

We examine interoffice flows between the headquarters and US-based offices of global banks, published by the Federal Reserve in its H8 data on foreign-related institutions. Interoffice Growth is the percentage growth in net interoffice assets of foreign banks in the US, winsorised at the 2.5%. Column 5 shows that Interoffice Growth is positive and significant, leaving other results unchanged, highlighting the role of interoffice flows.

We examine sub-periods of financial and banking crises. Even if we exclude the period post-2008, our main conclusions remain unchanged (column 6). We then include individual local country bank crisis dummies that has value 1 (0 otherwise) for each year of a country banking sector crisis as classified by Laeven and Valencia (2010). Column 7 shows that a local banking crisis has a negative effect on banking flows but this does not alter the role of our variable Global Leverage.

In untabulated regressions not reported for space reasons, we show that our results: a) are robust to the inclusion of different country-level regulations (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001, and subsequently updated) that may affect the leverage decisions of banks in each country; b) are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables, like the Chinn-Ito Index that measures a country’s degree of capital account openness or the level of legal enforcement test of overidentification with a p-value of 0.437 and 0.459, respectively, and as such, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The system GMM estimator makes the following additional exogeneity assumption that any correlation between our endogenous variables and the unobserved (fixed) effect is constant over time. We test this assumption directly using a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity. This test yields a p-value of 0.265 and 0.583, respectively, for the J-statistic produced by the difference-in-Hansen test and as such we cannot reject the hypothesis that the additional subset of instruments used in the system GMM estimates is exogenous.

8In untabulated results we verify that our results remain unchanged if we exclude the period 2007-2008 of the US financial crisis.

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in a country; c) do not vary systematically between developed and developing countries, suggesting that bank leverage decisions have global impact that is not differentially larger for emerging economies.

A.3 Accounting for Global Factors

To gauge the relative weight of local and global factors in explaining the variation of capital flows, we run four OLS regressions as modified specifications of our benchmark panel regression 38. The respective regressions include the following variables: 1) all the local variables (Local Leverage (in levels and growth), Local Equity Growth, ΔRER, ΔM2, ΔGDP, ΔDebt/GDP, Inflation); 2) all the local variables plus country dummies; 3) all the global variables (Global Leverage (in levels and growth) and Global Equity growth); 4) time dummies (quarterly) only. We then compare the adjusted R-squared from each regressions.

The $R^2$ statistic from the specifications with time dummies represent an upper bound on the goodness of fit, and we ask how close we get to this upper bound by using the variables selected from our model.\footnote{Our approach is in the spirit similar to the analysis performed by Doidge, Karolyi Stulz (2007) in an unrelated context of cross-country comparisons of corporate governance. Doidge, Karolyi Stulz (2007) attempt to measure the relative importance of firm-level factors and country-level factors in corporate governance. Their method proceeds by running regressions with different specifications with country-level variables and firm-level variables (See, Doidge, Karolyi Stulz (2007, Table 2)). They compare their results with that from a regression with country dummies, which gives a statistical upper bound on the importance of country-specific characteristics. By comparing the $R^2$ obtained from their favored specification with the $R^2$ from the country dummy regressions that give the upper bound, they are able to gauge the proportion of the total variation that can be captured by the country level variables.}

Table 3 reports the adjusted $R^2$ statistics from the four OLS specifications defined above. In Panel A, we report the results for the full sample. We see that local variables alone explain 8.4% of the variation (column 1), while the global variables alone explain 10.2% (column 3). When comparing column 3 with the hypothetical upper bound for a model that has all global factors (column 4), we see that our global variables account for $0.102/0.175 = 58\%$ of the total global variation. Comparing model (4) to model (2), we see that the adjusted R-squared of the time dummy regression is about twice that of the regression with country-specific variables and country-dummies. Consequently, the global characteristics dominate local characteristics in explaining the variation in banking flows.
Table 3. **Accounting for global factors.** This table compares the adjusted R-squared statistics obtained from 4 different OLS regression specifications of our main specification, with time dummies, country dummies, global variables and local variables. Panel A is for the full sample of countries. Panels B to E are for the sample of countries with large or low size of cross-border flows (Panel B), with high or low financial openness (Panel C), developed versus developing countries (Panel D) and with high or low institutional legal foundations (Panel E). See text for definitions and further methodological details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<td>0.089</td>
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<td>Global Variables</td>
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<td>Time Dummies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel B - Size of cross-border flows</td>
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<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.102</td>
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We then extend our analysis by exploring the extent to which specific country characteristics influence our results. In other words, we are interested in exploring whether country heterogeneity may explain cross border flows. We split the countries between the upper (High) and lower (Low) tercile distribution of the size of cross-border flows (BIS Table 7A-7B, Panel B), country openness (Chinn-Ito Index, Panel C), developed versus developing countries (Panel D) and legal enforcement (Law and Order, Panel E).

Panels B and C show that global factors have a significantly larger impact than local factors in countries more financially open and where banking flows are bigger. For instance, for countries subject to a large size of bank inflows (Panel B, High), model 3 gives $R^2 = 0.214$, which is 3.6 times higher than model 2’s $R^2 = 0.059$, meaning that our global variables explain significantly more of the variation in banking flows than local characteristics. The greater importance of global characteristics is most obvious when we use time dummy variables ($0.368/0.059 = 6.3$ times larger). In countries with lower banking inflows (Panel B, Low) global factors still explain more than local factors but with a difference that is lower in magnitude.

Panel D shows results for the sample of developed and developing countries. Global factors remain more important than local factors (model 4 versus model 2) in explaining the banking flows in both developed and developing countries. A similar picture emerge from Panel E where global factors seem to explain more of the variation in banking flows in countries with strong legal foundations.

Taken together, this analysis confirms that global factors explain much more of the variation in cross-border flows. At the same time, the findings point out the heterogenous effects of global factors depending on the magnitude of the inflows, level of financial openness and legal development.
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