The Massif Capital Review volume 1, No. 1 for the month of January-February 2017, titled, “Conglomerates Redux.”
Conglomerates are thought to be the troubled corporate structures of a bygone era. Investors often consider them as likely to destroy value as to create it. Wall Street Investment Analysts almost universally shun them; they never fit neatly into any industry or style box. It is probably safe to say that the conglomerate boom of the 1960s and 1970s was the heyday of the difficult to manage corporate structure. Nevertheless, conglomerates persist here and there and are well worth the diligent value-conscious investors’ attention.
At the most basic level, the conglomerate is a collection of different businesses within a single enterprise that have minimal interdependence. The claim that they create value for investors has always been, rightly, viewed with suspicion. The spectacular blow-ups of past conglomerates, LTV and Litton during the 1960s and more recently Valiant (a “Platform Company” or conglomerate by another name), surely justifies the skepticism. The blow-ups of these diverse corporate entities should come as no surprise; considerations other than value frequently drive conglomerate formation.
For example, the spread of conglomerates during the 1960s was driven as much by federal government antitrust policies during the 1950s (specifically the Celler—Kefauver Act of 1950 which made horizontal and vertical growth all but impossible) as it was any strategic logic. In some investors mind, the latest wave of conglomerate creation (specifically in pharmaceuticals and consumer goods) has again been, in part, caused by a government/central bank policy that has created a debt permissive environment.
Other market observers believe we are at the start of a new wave of technological conglomerates which spread into different industries in a search of the next big thing. Apple and Alphabet (Google), both have significant cash and need to do something with it, why not branch out? Some on Wall Street argue these new style conglomerates are of a very different nature than those of the 1960s. Tech giants may be product conglomerates (Apple – Computers, Watches, Phones, TVs, Software) but the companies maintain an internal strategic logic, different products connected by an ecosystem. A line of thought that is hard to argue with, but also not new. Conglomerates have a long come in two flavors: broad diversification (LTV, ITT) and narrow diversification (Textron and Teledyne).
Finally, there are the conglomerates at the heart of the spectacular growth of Asian Economies over the last thirty years. Mckinsey has calculated that over the past decade conglomerates made up 80% of the largest 50 companies by revenue in South Korea and revenue grew 11% a year. In India, conglomerates constitute 90% of the top 50 companies (excluding state firms) and have average revenue growth of 23% a year. Academics have weighed in and argued that the success of Asian Conglomerates is the result of an “institutional void” that will fill as the economies develop. Only time will tell, emerging firms may find it difficult to wrestle market share from politically connected companies with comparably bottomless budgets. Populism being what it is at the current time, the titans of Asian economies should be wary of spreading themselves too far.
In this issue of the Massif Capital Review, we take a deeper look at the now defunct conglomerate Beatrice Foods in search of clues as to what makes a successful and unsuccessful conglomerate. The end result, a short checklist to help the value conscious investor evaluate conglomerates. Three conglomerate investment ideas are also presented. Finally, a review of the performance of Asian Family Conglomerates over the past ten years.
A Brief History of Beatrice Foods
Over the course of the 100-year history of the now defunct conglomerate Beatrice, the company underwent many name changes and strategy pivots. When it was first founded in 1897 by George Haskell, the company was known as Beatrice Creamery Company, and it engaged in a narrow industry focused geographic expansion via acquisition. In 1945 the company changed its name to Beatrice Foods, in recognition of its shift from a narrowly focused dairy company to a narrowly focused food conglomerate.
The name changed again in 1983, this time to Beatrice Company, a name management felt better captured the company’s broad diversification into everything from bulk chemicals to Samsonite luggage. Finally, in 1986, following the leveraged buy-out of the company by KKR, the name was changed to BCI-Holdings, the name the company would have until all its many disparate parts had been sold off.
The strategic changes, and name changes, of Beatrice, are useful markers as they mirror phases of not only corporate America’s general strategic evolution but transitions from good practices to bad. Within each phase of the company’s growth and development, management established readily identifiable corporate practices that when taken together can serve as a checklist of things an investor should look for in a conglomerate investment and what to look out for.
Beatrice Creamery Company Era
In 1905 Beatrice Creamery Company CEO, George Haskell, engineered the acquisition of Continental Creamery Company of Topeka, Kansas. In doing so, not only did he achieve the largest consolidation in the history of the US dairy industry, but he also secured ownership of the strongest brand in the dairy business at that time, “Meadow Gold” (the Meadow Gold brand still exists and is owned by Dean Foods). The acquisition also made Beatrice the largest creamery in the world with operations throughout the United States.
Given the time sensitive nature of dairy products and the local nature of farms, Beatrice could only manage its coast to coast dairy operations via a decentralized corporate structure which put the onus of success on individual dairy plant managers. The creamery stage of Beatrice evolution thus highlights two important elements of a successful conglomerate: a minimal corporate office with specific functions (in this case legal, financial, marketing and quality control) and a heavy emphasis on a single set of performance standards and subsidiary accountability for performance.
As with all elements of business success, there are no hard and fast rules, and while a small corporate office is common throughout the history of successful conglomerates, it is not present in all successful conglomerates. Berkshire Hathaway has one of the smallest corporate offices of any publically traded company, but GE does not. What is common, and easier with a small corporate office, is decentralized management. From the outset, Beatrice pushed decision making own to the plant level, and in doing so placed responsibility for performance where sales and profits were generated.
When a division of a conglomerate is in trouble, there is little that corporate management can do about it. Beatrice HQ in Nebraska could do little to help when the milk spoiled at a West Coast distribution facility; plant management had to be empowered to act. The decentralized management system worked because Beatrice headquarters incentivized people correctly and clearly articulated performance expectations to plant management. The performance standard was plant specific and the incentive was based on the performance of the plant, not the company overall.
Accountability for achieving a clearly articulated performance standard is a practice repeated time and again at successful conglomerates. GE was once famous for its performance standard: if a business was not first or second in its industry, it should be sold or closed. The value of a common standard is that it removes sentimentality from the management process at all levels. The milk is delivered fresh, or not, either way, management at a subsidiary knows where it stands.
The Beatrice Food Era
During the Beatrice Food era, the company grew significantly, but it did not diversify broadly. Beatrice remained focused on food, buying companies like La Choy Food (Asian Food) in 1943 and DL Clark (Candy Bars) in 1955, a condensed milk plant in Malaysia in 1961 and food service equipment manufacturer Bloomfield industries in 1964. Two important traits of management’s strategy during this period relevant to other conglomerates and important for investors to look for in conglomerates was narrow diversification and the practice of only acquiring profitable companies with management willing to stay on after the acquisition.
Although conglomerates can often appear sprawling, the most successful conglomerates are narrowly focused. That may mean a narrow focus on one or two industries, as in the case of Beatrice, Teledyne, and Textron, or investment style, like Berkshire Hathaway. Regardless of how the definition of narrow diversification manifests itself, the result is the same: an outside investor can understand each acquisition within the context of a company’s historical evolution and management’s strategy going forward. The narrow focus acts as a screen directing management to businesses and industries it knows it can compete in, and perhaps more importantly, away from those it can’t.
The narrow focus combined with an insistence on acquiring only profitable companies (complete with management) also meant that Beatrice never bought any businesses that did not justify themselves. No acquisitions were made because of possible benefits from “synergies” because no acquisitions were ever integrated into the operations of other subsidiaries. Each acquisition was a business unto itself, managed by the same team it came in with and incentivized by the subsidiaries own performance. This practice allowed Beatrice corporate management to focus on evaluating performance and the allocating capital, and subsidiary management to focus on operations.
The Beatrice Company Era
During the period from 1977 to 1986, many of the practices that had helped Beatrice thrive were abandoned. Corporate management increased oversight of the decisions made at subsidiaries, additional layers of management were added, and the practice of narrow diversification came to an end. Previous acquisitions had also been small relative to the company’s overall size, acquisitions during this era were often large, and even when food-focused did not make sense in the context of the past.
The purchase of Tropicana, for instance, was so large that it had to work, or else it threatened the financial strength of the entire company. Furthermore, while Tropicana appears an acquisition consistent with the traditional diversity strategy it was far from it. Beatrice had historically stayed away from companies in commodity foods, preferring small niche or specialty companies. Beatrice had also shied away from any acquisition that would bring them into competition with other national food conglomerates like Coca-Cola and General Mills. Another unhappy outcome of the Tropican acquisition was the need to reduce debt by selling off proven profit-makers. The Tropicana acquisition should be viewed as a prototypical example of what a conglomerate should not do as they expand.
In 1986 Beatrice was taken over via LBO by KKR and dismantled, piece by piece, over the next four years. Despite the end, few management teams can claim the same level of success Beatrice had at its peak, nor the returns generated for investors. Fewer still can claim to have done it with a complex multi-product strategy. This brief historical overview points to a few sign posts investors should look for in their evaluation of a potential conglomerate investment:
- Small corporate office.
- Decentralized management.
- Subsidiary specific performance measures and subsidiary accountability.
- Narrow diversification.
- Only acquire profitable companies.
- Only acquire companies when management aggress to stay on post-acquisition.
Beatrice’s history also suggests several corporate practices to be warry of:
- Centralization of decision making.
- An excess of management responsible for management.
- Broad diversification.
- Overly large acquisition’s relative to the size of the company. Acquisitions so large that they might dilute earnings per share.
- Repeated management changes at acquired companies.
Three Conglomerate Investment Ideas
Steel Partners (SPLP)
Steel Partners Holdings L.P. (SPLP) is the successor of the successful Steel Partners hedge fund run by Warren Lichtenstein. At this time SPLP is a diversified holding company that operates primarily in industrial manufacturing and financial services. The primary holdings of SPLP are a 70% ownership stack in industrial manufacturer Handy & Harman, a 64% ownership interest in Steel Excel, which runs several small oil field services businesses (and is in the process of being bought out by the parent), a 6.5% ownership position in Aerojet Rocketdyne a leading manufacturer of rocket propulsion systems and a 90% ownership stake in WebBank, a bank focused on niche lending. The publicly traded holdings of the conglomerate are currently worth roughly 1% more than SPLP’s current market capitalization, without taking into account the value of several privately held subsidiaries, such as WebBank.
SPLP’s 6% position in Aerojet Rocketdyne, a manufacturer of propulsion systems for the defense and aerospace industries, will likely drive significant growth in the share price in the near future. The business has a stable and simple business model, with a foreseeable revenue stream focused primarily on long-term defense contracts. Given the current enterprise value of $1.8 billion and NTM EBITDA in line with 2016, AJRD currently trades at a TEV/NTM EBITDA multiple of 7.2x, peers such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin trade at multiples closer to 11.0x. Should AJRD rerate to a multiple more in line with its peers its per-share value would be closer to $33 a share or 83% more than it currently trades.
The company also owns roughly 11,300 acres of mostly development ready land 15 miles east of Sacramento. The land is on the balance sheet for $60 million yet comps and discussions with local commercial real estate brokerages suggest $120 to $175 million as a more realistic valuation, as such it represents an overlooked asset on Aerojet’s balance sheet. At the low end of the valuation the land is worth $1.7 per share, bringing the company value to $34.70, less approximately $7 a share in LT debt and the company is currently trading at a 35% discount, which does not take into account the 1% discount investors receive by acquiring shares through SPLP as opposed to through the open market.
WebBank is a Utah-based Industrial Bank, which focuses on revolving private label lending, bank card financing programs (branded credit cards) and alternative lending (loan origination for companies like Lending Club). The bank does not have a traditional banking business model, focusing on originating loans for client companies that pay them a fee for the service. At the current time, WebBank has a balance sheet value of $60 million, making WebBank a hidden gem. In 2015 the bank paid a cash dividend to SPLP of $9.5 million. The loan origination service is capital lite meaning WebBank earns a yield on capital employed in lending operations of as much as 30%. A simple dividend discount model suggests a value far in excess of book value and a comparables analysis to other alternative financial services companies that focus on consumer lending of various kinds, suggests WebBank is worth more like $263 million, after subtracting a 10% private company discount.
Management has an admirable investing track record that should not be dismissed because of the negative press surrounding closure of the Steel Partner’s hedge funds in the 2008-2009 period. Including an abysmal 2008, the hedge funds run by the current management team produced an average annual return 24% gross of fees. Management seems more then capable of speaking for themselves and so we will let them: While many management teams focus on short term performance, we focus on buying and operating companies in order to unlock and increase their value over the long term, for the benefit of all shareholders and stakeholders. As such, we are not concerned by short-term market fluctuations and volatility. As I have said many times before, and will continue to reiterate going forward, SPH invests on the basis of value, not on popularity. (2012 Letter)
Based on a sum-of-parts analysis SPLP is worth between $25 and $30 a share, depending principally on whether or not WebBank is valued at the low or high-end of our valuation range. At $25 a share the company is trading at discount to intrinsic value of 30%, at the high-end it is trading at a discount of 41%. Management also appears eager to close the valuation gap, issuing a special dividend of $0.15 a share at the end of 2016 and announcing the companies first ever investor day in 2017.
Massif Capital has a position in Steel Partners LP and a full write up is available via our website.
Loews is a well-known conglomerate managed by the Tisch family that has a long history of producing significant shareholder value. Over the last 50 years, Loews shares have increased at a CAGR of 16%, more than double the rate of return for the S&P 500 during the same period. Loews currently owns 90% of CNA Financial (CNA), a publically traded insurance company, 53% of Diamond Offshore (DO), a 51% stake in Boardwalk Pipeline Partners (BWP) and the Loews chain of hotels. The company has a strong balance sheet with $4.8 billion in cash and other investments. The Tish family manages the business with a value-oriented investment philosophy with an emphasis on efficient capital allocation. In keeping with that philosophy, the insider ownership is significant (roughly 20%).
NA is a publically traded property/casualty insurance and surety provider with a focus on specialty insurance lines and traditional commercial insurance. CNA’s business is principally focused on the US insurance market, generating approximately 90% of written premiums in the US. In 2015 and 2014 the firm achieved a combined ratio of 95.4% and 97.4%, through 3Q2016 CNA had a combined ratio of 90.4%. CNA’s insurance underwriting results have shown steady progress in recent years reflecting better underwriting and risk selection. In the low-interest-rate environment following the financial crisis, the investment portfolio has yielded an average of 4.2%. CNA’s current P/BV of 0.9x represents a reasonable discount to the 1.33x average P/BV for a group of publically traded peers. Continued underwriting progress and rising interest rates should help CNA close the pricing gap with the firm’s peers.
Loews’ investment in DO originated with the purchase of a predecessor company in 1989, during a time when energy sector firms were largely out of favor. DO has grown substantially over the years, and Loews’ stake has benefited from both capital appreciation and a return of capital via several billion dollars of special dividends. More recently DO has been challenged by the pullback in oil prices and the associated decline in day rates for offshore drilling rigs. The company’s recent results do not adequately reflect DO’s potential earnings power given the companies rig fleet is newer on average than most offshore drillers. In an offshore industry recovery to more normalized levels, DO is positioned for significant profit improvement. Should weakness in the industry continue, DO has a strong balance sheet compared to peers and could benefit from the opportunistic acquisition of assets by distressed sellers.
BWP is a publicly traded midstream MLP that provides transportation, storage, gathering and processing of natural gas and liquids. BWP operates in the U.S. market and has a significant presence in the Gulf Coast region. The firm’s customer base primarily consists of energy producers and distributors, electricity generators, and industrial companies. Over 80% of BWP’s revenue is derived from contracts related to the reservation of pipeline capacity. BWP has faced its share of challenges during recent years, and the company announced in 2014 that it would cut its cash distribution to shareholders by 81%. The reduction enabled the firm to continue to fund growth initiatives despite the challenging industry environment. BWP continues to trade at a discount to peers which will likely continue as long as the unit distribution remains significantly below average for the industry.
Loews final subsidiary is the Loews Hotel chain which consists of 24 hotels that generated $604 million in revenue in 2015. 13 of the hotels are wholly owned by Loews, 9 are JVs in which Loews is a 50% owner, and Loews manages the remaining 2 hotels on behalf of other owners. According to 3Q2016 Lodging Investment Outlook by JLL hotel cap rates during the first nine-months of 2016 averaged 7.7%, implying the Loews hotel chain is worth approximately $1.0 billion.
Historically CNA has traded at a Price to Book value of 0.8x which means at the current time CNA is trading at a slight premium to a historical Price to Book implied valuation. This is in keeping with improved operating results. It is trading at a discount to peers, creating the potential for price improvement. DO, and BWP are both trading at slight discounts to their historical EV/EBIT ratios, which given the run that oil and gas related companies have had in the past twelve months is unsurprising. DO is currently trading at a TEV to LTM EBIT of 12.5x vs a ten-year average of 15.3x. Given the offshore industry struggles, this relatively small discount seems warranted, suggesting DO is fairly valued at the current price. BWP is currently trading at a TEV to LTM EBIT of 18.1x vs. a ten-year average of 19.3x. In the case of BWP, the minor discount seems generous given that the distribution remains well below the historical average and below the industry average. Given all the above a sum-of-parts analysis implies the valuation presented in the table on the below page.
Despite trading at a discount of roughly 10% to the intrinsic value estimate presented above the risks associated with BWP, and the potential for ongoing struggles at DO as the offshore oil and natural gas industry continues to suffer, the margin of safety does not seem sufficient to warrant an investment. Although the margin of safety for this conglomerate appears thin, management’s focus on value and history of both opportunistic acquisition’s and smart share buybacks suggests investors should keep an eye on Loews. Any pull back to the 2016 lows of $34 to $35 a share is a buying opportunity.
Massif Capital does not have a position in Loews.
Founded in 1822, Bollore Group is a French Fortune 500 holding company that is majority controlled by the Bollore family. The company owns subsidiaries focused on logistics/port services, manufacturing, midstream oil and natural gas, advertising and battery technology. In addition, the company has an equity portfolio comprised of retail, media and telecommunications investments (the most significant of which is a growing stake in Vivendi). A common critique of conglomerates by investors is the difficulty of valuing the company due to the often complex corporate structures. The complexity of Bollore’s corporate structure makes most other corporate structures look simple, and more importantly for the investor, hides significant value.
The complexity of the Bollore ownership structure is rooted in the ownership loops, in which a parent owns a subsidiary which owns shares in the parent. The effect is the same as reducing the number of shares outstanding by increasing the amount of treasury stock held by the parent company. The point of the complex corporate structure is to maximize control with minimum capital, but it also means shareholders receive an economic benefit that is disproportionate to their actual ownership percentage. The example to the right is adapted from a detailed review of the corporate structure of Bollore by Muddy Waters conducted in early 2015 (Muddy Waters is long Bollore).The effect of this complex ownership structure is to reduce the shares outstanding by roughly 40% to 50%.
The two most significant assets held by Bollore are the logistics business and the growing stake in Vivendi. The logistics business operates globally but has a focus on Africa. African operations consist of 16 container ports, more than ten million square meters of African warehouse facilities and a “last mile” distribution network comprised of more than 6,000 vehicles in 46 African countries (there are 54 countries in Africa) as well as rail concessions. Bollore has been operating a logistics and freight forwarding businesses in Africa since the 1980’s and managing private port concessions since the 1990’s. The port business is a particularly strong franchise for the company as the concessions are typically 20 to 40 years and geography limits the opportunity for competitors to build ports.
Combined with the developed world logistics business, Bollore is one of the larger integrated multimodal logistics companies in the world. The combined 2015 revenue of both segments was €6.1 billion, of which 56% comes from operations in developed countries and the remainder from the African operations. While a sum of parts analysis is appropriate for Bollore as a whole, the number of slices an analyst takes needs carefully consideration. Most sum-of-parts assessments of Bollore break out the African segment and the Developed world segment and evaluate separately; we think this is an error.
The African Logistics business is the most likely source of future growth for the firm, but at the current time, 70 of every 100 containers moving through a West African Port (where Bollore has concentrated its African port operations) are being imported into Africa.
As such, any logistics business in Africa is heavily dependent on logistics services throughout the rest of the world. To underestimate the interconnectedness of the logistics segments is a mistake and separate analysis may inflate the value of the African business. A selection of competitors in the ports and logistics businesses trade at an average EV/EBITDA ratio of 11.0x, which implies that Bollore Logistics has a total enterprise value of around €8.5 billion.
The second most valuable asset in the Bollore portfolio is the company’s 21% ownership stake in Vivendi. Vivendi has a long history as a European media and telecommunications conglomerate but in recent years has focused on TV, film, and music. The majority of the businesses revenue comes from the company’s Universal Music Group business and Canal+. Universal Music group is the most prominent bright spot in the Vivendi portfolio, it is the largest of the three global music labels and stands to benefit from the current consumer shift towards music streaming. Given the growing percentage of UMG revenue derived from subscription services, which may have exceeded 50% of the division’s revenues in 2016 and certainly will in 2017, a DCF analysis of the subsidiary suggests a value €9 to €10 billion.
The biggest challenge facing Bollore in regards to its Vivendi investment is ongoing efforts to turn around Canal+ which has suffered from declining subscriber numbers in its French pay-tv business. The declines have been partial offset by the growth in its International pay TV business, which has an average CAGR of 15% from 2012 to 2015. The International business may be the future, with operations in Poland, throughout French Speaking Africa, Vietnam and in almost all geographies with significant French Speaking populations globally. The business is currently engaged in a restructuring that includes significant cost savings, and a new pricing structure focused on increasing the number subscription options consumers have and reducing churn. Based on a DCF analysis with a 10% discount rate and a terminal growth rate of 1% Canal+ is worth approximately €5.3 billion.
Questions remain about the future of Vivendi as the company has significant stakes in Telecom Italia (worth €3.2 billion) and Mediaset (worth €1.4 billion). The Mediaset position is increasingly looking like a hostile takeover but only time will tell. The hostility between Mediaset and Vivendi arose out of planned for acquisition of Mediaset Premium which Vivendi backed out of. As a result, Mediaset filed suit against Vivendi, who responded by buying 3% of Mediaset in the open market without advance notice, taking its position in the company up to 28.8% with the stated intention of taking it higher.
Vincent Bollore, CEO of Bollore, is five years away from retirement and appears likely to work feverishly during the next five years to both simplify the complex corporate structure, unlocking significant shareholder value, and right the ship at Vivendi. Based on our sum-of-parts analysis Bollore appears to be worth anywhere from €8 to €10 a share after accounting for the reduced shares outstanding as a result of the ownership loops.
The Asian Family-Owned Conglomerate
2016 was not a great year for the reputation of several Asian Conglomerates. Two of the continents biggest, Samsung and Toshiba, both spent the majority of the year rattled by exploding phones and scandal. Despite recent events the Asian Conglomerate, and more specifically the Family Owned Conglomerate, remains a driving force behind growth in Asia. According to a recent McKinsey study over the past decade the largest conglomerates in China (excluding state-owned enterprises) and India expanded their revenues by more than 20% and those in South Korea exceed 10% annual revenue growth.
Equity markets tend to ascribe a discount to the valuation of conglomerates but given the economic clout and political connectedness of many of Asia’s conglomerates one has to wonder if this is as true in Asia as it is in the United States or Europe. Furthermore, given the breadth of operations many of these companies have outside the US, particularly in fast growing emerging markets the publically traded arms of these conglomerates should have low correlation with US Equity Indexes and perhaps even outperform them.
To test this hypothesis, we put together an index of family owned conglomerates in developing Asia (excluding Japan), based on a list of the 33 most significant and influential family owned-conglomerates in Asia published in the December 1st 2016 issue of the Nikkei Asia Review. We then compared the index to the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the NASDAQ. Based on results of our simple study, in which we looked at valuation metrics and correlations between the indexes, not only does our Asian-Family Owned Conglomerate Index trade at a valuation discount to US indices but its performance is comparable to all but the NASDAQ over a ten-year period ended January 6th, 2016, and in the last year it outperformed all but the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Over a ten-year period, the Asian Family Conglomerate Index had the second lowest standard deviation, a measure of stock volatility, of the four indexes. To better interpret the standard deviation of returns in relation to the mean return, the coefficient of variation was also calculated. The Coefficient of Variation is a measure of the dispersion of returns relative to the mean, and thus a measure of stability of returns. The Asian Family Conglomerate Index had the lowest coefficient of variation of all four indexes, suggesting it has the most attractive volatility adjusted returns. The companies grow and grow steadily.
From a valuation perspective the Asian Family Conglomerate Index traded at an average Price/Tangible Book Value of 1.52x over the last ten years vs. and an average of 2.81x across the three US indexes. Finally, the Asian Family Conglomerate Index is currently trading at a discount of 5.8% to its 10-year average TEV/EBIT ratio vs. the three US indexes which are trading at an average of 124% of their 10-year average.
For stock pickers, this abbreviated analysis of Asian Family Owned Conglomerates vs. US Indices suggests that the group is perhaps a good hunting ground for value. For asset allocators or thematic investors, this analysis suggests their clients would be well served by having an allocation or exposure to some or all of the Asian Family owned conglomerates.
See the full PDF below.