FPA Capital Fund webcast audio, transcript And slides for the second quarter ended June 30, 2016.
FPA Capital Fund 2Q16 Webcast Audio
FPA Capital Fund 2Q16 Webcast Transcript
Arik Ahitov: Let me go over our strategy briefly. We are a long-only absolute value fund that is benchmark-agnostic. We look for marketing-leading companies with a history of profitability, strong balance sheets, and good management teams. Once we identify and research these companies, we buy when there is a compelling risk-to-reward ratio. The resulting portfolio tends to be concentrated. As many of you know, our Fund has been closed the majority of its life, and both Dennis and I are shareholders alongside you.
We are benchmark-agnostic. As of the end of last quarter, two sectors—mainly information technology and energy—made up about 50% of the assets. (01:56) You can see on this slide that our portfolio is very differentiated from Russell 2500 and it was not expected to behave similarly to the Index.
Many of you met me or Dennis before. Our team also includes two analysts. Chris has been with us since 2014 and we have introduced him here before. Sean recently joined our team straight for the UCLA Business School where he was, among many other things, an Edward Shapiro Investment Management Fellow, a Director of the Anderson Investment Association, and a Member of the Student Investment Fund. His last full-time position before he attended busies school was with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Our performance has been weak since the fourth quarter of 2014. The cumulative effect of this two-and-one-half years shows itself as unfavorable, long-term numbers. As we mentioned before, these multiyear performance numbers are very endpoint-dependent and we believe can improve substantially as quickly as they deteriorated. As disappointed as we are with our result in the past six quarters, we are optimistic about our portfolio prospectively.
There are a few reasons why we are confident about the future. The volatility we have been expecting seemed to finally arrived, which should allow us to take advantage of more opportunities. As some longtime shareholders already know, this is not the first time the Fund has underperformed to this extent. In both prior occasions the Fund’s performance during the ensuing time periods have allotted to not only make for lost ground, but also surpass the performance of this benchmark once again.
(3:45) We do not believe that it should be any different this time around. Our process has not changed over the past 30 years. Our portfolio is filled with strong-but-cheap companies. In addition, the Fund has ample liquidity with over 25% cash to take advantage of this volatile time for the stock market.
The portfolio continues to be cheap. Our holdings trade at a significant discount both in price-to-earnings and price-to-book terms versus our benchmark. Keep in mind that the price-to-earnings ratio shown here is based on current earnings, which are really depressed for a meaningful part of our portfolio. The price-to-earnings ratio calculated based on normalized earnings would depict even a stronger advantage versus the indices.
Let’s talk about what we have been doing. Since the middle of 2014 all prices decreased substantially, yet we continue to buy during this downturn. You can see what we did by looking at the blue bars that show the change in our allocation in energy names. The gray bars show the oil price change. You can see that in the second half of 2014, the price of oil decreased by about 50%, but our allocation decreased by only 20%. In the first quarter of 2015, we continued buying as the price of oil decreased. You might recall, the end of second quarter of 2015 oil prices moved up quite a bit and we took advantage of that increase by selling some of the shares we bought earlier. The next two quarters, oil prices continued to decline and we continued to increase our exposure.
Here is a good example of what we did in the first quarter of 2016. As you can see on this chart, oil prices started the year at $37 a barrel and ended the first quarter only marginally higher but the price at $26 in the quarter. If you look at this chart on the right, you can see that one of our portfolio companies, SM Energy, looks like had no change in price but all the volatility. (06:02) And now you see that our share count did not change when one compares the beginning-of-the-quarter share count with end-of-the-quarter share count. But this is what we did. We bought over 400,009 shares during the first half of the quarter, which translates to more than a 50% increase. And we sold almost all the incremental shares in the second quarter at higher prices.
The volatility continued in the second quarter and we started utilizing covered calls to take advantage. We executed three covered calls in the quarter. All, as you can imagine, were in energy due to high volatility and, hence, high premium.
Here is another example. This one is not the short-term fate, but an example of how we flex up and down on ownership based on the estimate of intrinsic value and the prevailing stock price. On this chart you see that we have owned Western Digital for a long time. But at different times we increased our position substantially and at other times we sold into strength. The last major change has happened over the past 12 months when we increased our position again from the third quarter of 2015 to the end of second quarter of 2016.
The top performer for the quarter was Patterson. Patterson is a domestic land-drilling company in the energy sector. The bottom performer was Dana Holdings, which is an auto-parts supplier. After the end of the second quarter, Dana reported its quarterly earnings and the stock price moved up 25% since then.
Our portfolio remains concentrated. Almost half the portfolio is in technology and energy. We now own two high-yield bonds. Cash is the residual of all investment ideas and it stood at about 27% at the end of the second quarter.
(08:00) We have been very active year to date. We initiated two new positions and exited three. We had a net increase or net decrease in almost all our positions.
With that, I will turn the call over to Dennis.
Dennis: Thank you, Arik. Let’s first review some equity market data. This chart shows the rolling 10-year return difference between value and growth stocks. As we can see from 2004 through 2015, value stocks have underperformed growth stocks, just like two prior periods over the past 80 years. Remember, these are rolling 10-year numbers; thus, when the blue line crossed zero percent at the end of 2013, that meant value stocks had underperformed growth stocks over the prior 10 years.
Interestingly, this cycle has yet to turn back up and value stocks have now underperformed for more than 12 years on a 10-year rolling basis. However, as one can clearly see, not only have value