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Bill Ackman Detailed Long Valeant, Short Herbalife Thesis – Q3 Letter

Bill Ackman Q3 letter stay tuned for analysis – below are excerpts on Valeant, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Herbalife
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Valeant (VRX)

Valeant’s stock price declined significantly in the quarter as a result of statements by politicians regarding drug price increases, subpoenas from regulators, attacks by short sellers, and the termination of Valeant’s relationship with Philidor, a specialty pharmacy distribution channel used for dermatology products. On October 30, 2015, we held an investor conference call to answer the many questions we received about our investment in Valeant. Approximately six weeks ago, Valeant’s board formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the recent allegations made against Philidor, including claims that Valeant management was involved in the alleged wrongdoing at Philidor. The committee has hired former U.S. Deputy Attorney General and Kirkland & Ellis partner Mark Filip to lead the investigation. Valeant will hold an in-person, half-day investor meeting tomorrow, Wednesday, December 16th, to provide updated financial guidance for 2016, review the company’s strategy, and answer investor questions. We believe that this is an important step for Valeant to restore investor confidence. On November 23rd, we filed a 13D reflecting our increased stake in Valeant. Before we increased our position, we did substantial due diligence by re-underwriting our investment in the company. In particular, we reviewed all of the short sellers’ allegations, the potential political and regulatory risks, the impact of the shutdown of Philidor, and the company’s capital structure, debt covenants, and overall financial risk. We updated our financial model in light of recent business developments in order to better assess free cash flows, how quickly the company would be able to reduce leverage, the probability of financial distress, and to determine a conservative estimate of Valeant’s intrinsic value. Ultimately, we concluded that the risk of bankruptcy or financial distress was de minimis in light of (1) the highly cash-flow-generative nature of the business, (2) the minimal debt maturities over the next several years, (3) the nature of Valeant’s financial covenants, and the highly diversified (both by therapeutic area and geography) product portfolio. Because Valeant owns a highly diversified, divisible, and desirable portfolio of products that can be soldproduct-by- product and/or division-by-division in an industry with many well-capitalizedbuyers, it could deleverage at an even more rapid rate if it chose to do so. Once we determined that the risk of financial default was extremely small and the stock was trading at an enormous discount to intrinsic value, we considered various approaches to increasing our investment.
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Generally, we purchase stocks outright to get exposure to a particular investment. In this case, we took advantage of the high volatility of Valeant stock, its extremely low share price, and the high degree of market uncertainty in choosing to build a position that offered us a compelling reward for the potential risk. Rather than purchase common stock outright, we increased our investment through a contemporaneous series of over-the-counter option transactions. The bulk of the increase in our investment in Valeant was created through the sale of European-style put options struck at a $60 stock price, the purchase of American-style call options at a $95 stock price, and the sale of European-style call options at $165 stock price, all of which expire in January 2017. This derivative position gives us the upside of the stock from $95 per share up to $165 per share until January 2017. The net purchase price of the options was $6.75. In summary, if the stock rises to $165 or more by January 2017, we will make more than 10 times our net investment over this period. Our downside is equal to the net purchase price of each option plus the decline in the stock price, if any, below $60 per share as of January 2017. By selling European-style put options, the shares cannot be put to us until January of 2017. By then, we estimate that Valeant’s stock price will be substantially in excess of $60 per share, potentially several multiples of this price. The upside of our derivative investment is approximately equal to that of owning the stock outright at $95 per share with 30% less downside, i.e., if the stock were to go zero, we would lose approximately $67 per share, (the put strike price plus the net option premium). By selling two options for every option that we have purchased, we have also minimized the effective cost of this investment and limited the impact of rapid time value decay which is characteristic of an outright option purchase on a highly volatile stock. In a worse-case scenario, which we believe is extremely unlikely to occur, we risked approximately 4% of additional capital on this investment while increasing our notional exposure to Valeant by about 6% of the portfolio. We added to our investment because we believe that Valeant shares are enormously undervalued. While we expect a degree of disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business, we believe that the fundamentals of Valeant’s overall business remain strong. Just this morning, Valeant announced a 20-year agreement with Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., the largest pharmacy chain in the U.S. with more than 8,000 units, which will “more than replace” Valeant’s Philidor specialty pharmacy distribution. We believe that this agreement will go a long way to addressing concerns about the disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business by expanding convenient and affordable access to Valeant products, and will help restore credibility by the company partnering with the largest and best-managed pharmacy chain. The agreement provides for discounted pricing for Valeant’s dermatology and ophthalmology products reducing costs for the health care system. Valeant’s stock price is currently impacted by the high degree of uncertainty created by the shutdown of Philidor and the corresponding investigation of allegations, recent political scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry, negative press coverage of Valeant, and technical trading factors. These technical factors include: (1) the large amount of tax-loss selling which will likely continue until year end, (2) redemption-related sales from funds whose performance was affected by the decline in Valeant’s stock price, (3) “window dressing” where investment managers who held Valeant stock sell it before year-end so they do not need to show their investors the actual losses they incurred holding the position, and (4) the inherent complexity of the company that requires substantial due diligence before new investors establish their investment. Because of the controversy around Valeant, many portfolio managers have been unwilling to retain an investment in the company as client scrutiny and headline risk became intolerable. In light of the above technical factors, we believe that most new investors would prefer to wait to establish an investment in Valeant until after the upcoming analyst day and when year-endtechnical factors abate. There are a number of relatively short-term catalysts that we believe may lift the overhang on Valeant shares. We expect that this morning’s announcement will reduce if not eliminate concerns about disruptions in the distribution of Valeant’s dermatology products. We expect that additional uncertainty will begin to dissipate at tomorrow’s analyst day when the company will announce its revenues and earnings guidance for 2016 and answer questions from existing and prospective investors. In addition, we expect the results of the Philidor investigation to be announced sometime in the first quarter of next year. The company will likely file its 10-K in February with the results of Price Waterhouse’s year-end audit. This should comfort investors who have concerns about Valeant’s accounting. While we expect a messy fourth quarter due to the shutdown of Philidor and investigative costs, the company should be able to post “clean” quarters beginning in the second quarter of next year. With the passage of time, the reduction in uncertainty, increased transparency, the reporting of operating results which we anticipate to be strong, along with the deleveraging of the balance sheet, we expect Valeant stock to rise substantially. …………… Fannie Mae (FNMA) / Freddie Mac (FMCC) The GSEs’ continue to show healthy underlying trends in their core guarantee business, which have been obscured by non-cash, accounting-based derivative losses in the GSEs’ non-coreinvestment portfolio. Changes in the value of the derivatives create enormous volatility in the GSEs’ GAAP quarterly earnings, even though they do not have an impact on economic earnings or intrinsic value. Because the net worth sweep does not allow the GSEs to retain capital, it is likely that future accounting-based derivative losses could cause the GSEs to borrow additional funds from Treasury despite having no economic need to do so. This is yet another example of why the Net Worth Sweep is problematic. Since our last call, there has been a growing belief among highly regarded and politically influential groups and thought leaders that the GSEs must retain capital and exit conservatorship. Substantial questions have been raised about the government’s legal justification for the Net Worth Sweep. We encourage you to read Gretchen Morgenson’s December 13th New York Times article on the GSEs entitled: “Fannie and Freddie’s Government Rescue Has Come With Claws,” which can be found here:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/business/fannie-and-freddies-government-rescue-has-come-with-claws.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0. Recently, the Community Home Lenders Association and Community Mortgage Lenders of America, two organizations representing the politically powerful community banks, wrote a letter to the White House arguing for capital retention and an end to conservatorship for the GSEs. There have also been reports that the White House is considering various alternatives for recapitalizing the GSEs. Although government officials have denied these reports, we find it interesting that these reports have surfaced amid a growing consensus that a recapitalization of the GSEs is needed. At the end of October, a shareholder of both Fannie and Freddie’s common stock filed suit against the Net Worth Sweep in Kentucky. This case provides another avenue for pressing the case against the Net Worth Sweep in addition to the cases in the DC District Court of Appeals and the Federal Court of Claims. The GSEs underlying guarantee business is in healthy shape, the momentum for capital retention and an exit for conservatorship are growing, and the legal avenues for fighting the Net Worth Sweep have increased. Herbalife (HLF) Short Our thesis on HLF remains unchanged. We believe that Herbalife will ultimately be subject to regulatory action or will collapse because of fundamental deterioration in its business which relies on the continual recruitment of new victims. During the quarter, the potential for regulatory action increased while business fundamentals deteriorated. From a regulatory perspective, we view the Complaint that the FTC filed on August 17th against Vemma Nutrition Company (“Vemma”), another MLM whose structure is similar to HLF’s, as a very positive development. The preliminary injunction issued against Vemma on September 18this likely to make Vemma’s business totally unviable and provides a template for claims the FTC could bring against Herbalife. On October 27th, New York State Senator Jeff Klein, working with Public Advocate Letitia James and a non-profit community group called Make The Road New York, released a critical report on Herbalife titled: “The American Scheme: Herbalife’s Pyramid Shakedown”. Based on its hidden camera investigations of more than 60 nutrition clubs located in New York City, the report concluded that Herbalife distributors are “running an illegal pyramid scheme.” The report was supported by data from 56 victims who individually lost as much as $100,000. On December 9th, Sen. Klein held a public roundtable to advance his campaign to stop Herbalife’s deceptive tactics. Senator Klein has proposed New York State legislation that would amend the New York State General Business Law to better protect New York State residents. Despite predictions from Herbalife supporters that regulatory investigations would end during the quarter, they appear to have intensified. The company has now spent a total of $101 million defending itself, including $11.2 million in the quarter. Expenses related to “responding to governmental inquiries” increased from $5.8 million last quarter to $7.6 million this quarter which reflects the growing intensity of ongoing investigations. Assuming Herbalife is spending about $500 per hour on lawyers, $7.6 million represents 15,200 hours of legal time during the quarter, or 168 hours of legal time per day, seven days per week. Herbalife’s fundamentals continued to decline during the quarter. Notably “total members” – perhaps Herbalife’s most important operating metric – declined from 4.1 million in the second quarter to 4.0 million in third quarter indicating that Herbalife churned through at least 500,000 members as the rate of member churn exceeded Herbalife’s ability to find new victims.3 On its conference call, the company also began using a new operating metric called ‘active members,’ suggesting that Herbalife concedes that a proportion – we expect, a large proportion – of its members are inactive. In our experience, companies that change the standards by which they measure themselves do so only when the old metric shows business deterioration that they would rather not disclose. With respect to third quarter earnings, Herbalife posted weak revenues, but was able to reduce or defer certain expenses in order to generate earnings that exceeded analyst estimates. Among other questionable add-backs, Herbalife excludes regulatory and costs to “defend its business model” from its earnings estimates despite the fact that these expenses are likely to continue. On a consolidated basis, the company reported net sales of $1.1 billion, down 12% year-over-year,which was worse than Street expectations and below management guidance. The negative variance was largely attributable to foreign exchange headwinds. Similar to last quarter, China continues to be the key driver of Herbalife’s growth. While China’s year-over-year growth was 25%, Herbalife China revenues declined 5% when compared to the previous quarter. Notably, HLF’s South Korean market continued to show substantial deterioration in the quarter. South Korea has been one of Herbalife’s largest markets and a significant driver of the company’s revenue and earnings growth. Over the last several years, South Korea has been Herbalife’s third or fourth largest market and one of its most profitable with approximately 56% contribution margins versus 43% for the rest of the company. Beginning a year ago, Herbalife Korea began to decline. This deterioration accelerated notably this quarter, down 39% versus last year on a constant-currency basis, and down 46% on an actual basis. While management continues to blame the decline in Korea on “changes in the business model,” to us this looks like the classic “pop-and-drop” that is pervasive in pyramid schemes, a phrase that CEO Michael Johnson previously used to describe Herbalife’s rapid growth and inevitable decline in certain geographical regions. If one is looking for obvious evidence that Herbalife is a pyramid scheme, one need only look at the massive growth and rapid decline of Herbalife’s South Korea business and compare it with Unilever or another legitimate consumer packaged goods company. Full letter below in PDF Bill Ackman Pershing-Square-Holdings-Ltd.-Q3-Investor-Letter1

Bill Ackman Valeant
Bill Ackman

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