There is a full-blown crisis developing in the emerging markets that has more than one serious commentator thinking of 1998. On Thursday, the lead article in the business section of USA Today asked “Are we poised for a repeat of 1998 — or worse?” Yet as I highlighted in last week’s Outside the Box, the US Federal Reserve has very clearly said that problems in the emerging markets are not the concern of US policy. One of my favorite thinkers, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard over at the London Telegraph, wrote this on Wednesday:
This has the makings of a grave policy error: a repeat of the dramatic events in the autumn of 1998 at best; a full-blown debacle and a slide into a second leg of the Long Slump at worst.
Emerging markets are now big enough to drag down the global economy. As Indonesia, India, Ukraine, Brazil, Turkey, Venezuela, South Africa, Russia, Thailand and Kazakhstan try to shore up their currencies, the effect is ricocheting back into the advanced world in higher borrowing costs. Even China felt compelled to sell $20bn of US Treasuries in July.
Back in 1998 the developed world was twice as big as the developing world. Today that ratio is about even. We all know what a crisis for the markets 1998 was. And now, more than a few emerging markets have clear debt problems denominated in currencies other than their own.
Evans-Pritchard goes on to say:
Yet all we heard from Jackson Hole this time were dismissive comments that the emerging market rout is not the Fed’s problem. “Other countries simply have to take that as a reality and adjust to us,” said Dennis Lockhart, the Atlanta Fed chief. Terrence Checki from the New York Fed said “there is no master stroke that will insulate countries from financial spillovers”.
The price of oil in Indian rupees has gone from 1100 to 7800 in the space of 10 years. Think about what a move like that would do to the US economy. (Chart courtesy of Dennis Gartman)
The next chart shows the recent price spike in the Chinese SHIBOR (their short-term interbank rate, more or less equivalent to LIBOR). It is difficult to trust any of the economic data (positive or negative) coming out of China, so we really do not know whether China’s growth story is simply moderating or whether we are seeing a hard landing in progress; but the sudden shock in interbank lending rates is an important sign that all is not well in the Middle Kingdom. The big question: is the recent SHIBOR spike a harbinger of a banking crisis, or does it presage an RMB devaluation? Interbank rates do not spike from 3% to 13% (in about 2.5 weeks) in a healthy economy, and a big event along these lines in China would have enormous implications for global growth.
Full article here